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FEDERAL REGULATION OF 
AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGIES 
Thomas 0. McGarity* 
The scientific community in the United States, barely a dec-
ade ago, witnessed a great public debate about a new kind of 
scientific research using "recombinant DNA" techniques.1 In the 
intervening years, the controversy over the possible hazards of 
that research has dimmed, 2 but we have launched into another 
full-scale debate over the risks and benefits of the technologies 
that have grown out of that research. Perhaps the most intense 
controversy has centered on agricultural uses of newly emerging 
biotechnologies.3 Although agricultural biotechnologies will un-
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1. See J. GOODFIELD, PLAYING Goo (1977); M. ROGERS, BIOHAZARD (1973); N. WADE, 
THE ULTIMATE EXPERIMENT (1977). 
2. See Levin, Changing Views of the Hazards of Recombinant DNA Manipulation 
and the Regulation of these Procedures, 7 RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL. 107 
(1984). 
3. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Natural Resources, 
Agriculture Research and Environment and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and 
Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 135 
(1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework Hearing]; Planned Releases of Genetically-
Altered Organisms: The Status of Government Research and Regulation: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science 
and Technology, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1985) [hereinafter Planned Release Hearing]; 
Biotechnology Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 98-193 (1984) 
[hereinafter Biotechnology Regulation Hearing]; Environmental Implications of Ge-
netic Engineering: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight and 
the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science 
and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1983) [hereinafter Environmental Implica-
tions Hearing]; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE 
COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON ISSUES IN THE FED-
ERAL REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY: FROM RESEARCH TO RELEASE (Comm. Print 1986) 
[hereinafter ISSUES IN FEDERAL REGULATION REPORT]; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGA-
TIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 99TH CONG., 2D 
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questionably provide large benefits to farmers, food processors, 
agricultural supply companies, and consumers, they may also 
cause unanticipated harm. The environmental risks of highly 
touted chemical pesticides that emerged after World War II did 
not become apparent until long after those pesticides had be-
come an almost indispensable component of modern agriculture. 
The data base assembled during the 1950's and 1960's on the 
risks of pesticides was not nearly up to the task of evaluating 
their risks, and regulatory agencies are still playing catch-up in 
the 1980's. Ironically, one of the most highly proclaimed benefits 
of agricultural biotechnology is its potential to reduce or elimi-
nate the need for the chemical pesticides and fertilizers that 
only thirty years ago promised a "green revolution" in 
agriculture. 
If we can implement an effective process for assessing and 
managing the risks of agricultural biotechnologies, we may per-
haps avoid the unpleasant history of chemical pesticides. The 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) have recently established 
policies and proposed regulations aimed at implementing an ef-
fective regulatory process under existing statutes. Although their 
efforts represent a sound beginning, the existing regulatory re-
gime is still inadequate. Additional administrative action can fill 
some of the gaps, but a fully effective regulatory regime may re-
quire congressional attention. 
Part I of this Article describes some of the risks and benefits 
of newly emerging agricultural biotechnologies. After discussing, 
in Part II, the role of federal agencies in regulating agricultural 
biotechnologies, Part III of the Article proposes elements for an 
adequate regulatory regime. Part IV then measures the existing 
legal authorities, as implemented by the USDA and the EPA, 
against the ideal elements. Part V examines the willingness of 
these agencies to regulate. Finally, Part VI suggests changes that 
can be made in the current regulatory regime to bring about 
more effective regulation and to enhance public trust in regula-
tory decisions. 
SESS., REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING (Comm. 
Print 1984) [hereinafter GENETIC ENGINEERING]. 
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I. THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY" 
Agricultural biotechnology encompasses a bewildering variety 
of agricultural applications of genetic engineering to agriculture, 
including biological pesticides, animal biologics, genetically engi-
neered crops, and microorganisms designed to produce soil nu-
trients. All of these possible uses for biotechnology may have nu-
merous benefits to society, but many pose potential risks as well. 
4. I will use the term "biotechnology" here in a very simplistic way to denote the use 
of modern or "novel" techniques, such as recombinant DNA, for modifying genetic mate-
rial in plants or microorganisms to achieve socially desirable results. I will use the term 
"agricultural biotechnology" to refer to modern genetic engineering technologies that are 
directly applicable to agriculture, and I will confine my attention to genetically engi-
neered microorganisms and plants. 
The standard definitions of biotechnology are generally drawn in a broader fashion 
than this to include traditional fermentation and breeding technologies. See, e.g., U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTECHNOLOGY: AGRICULTURE'S REGULATORY SYSTEM NEEDS 
CLARIFICATION 8-9 (1986) [hereinafter GAO USDA REPORT]. I have narrowed the scope of 
the definition for purposes of this Article to facilitate the discussion of the risks and 
benefits of modern biotechnologies. I do not mean to imply that modern biotechnologies 
are necessarily more hazardous (or even more useful) than traditional biotechnologies; 
nor do I mean to imply that the use of modern techniques to produce an agriculturally 
useful product will necessarily have any impact on the regulatory approach taken to the 
product. It may well be that an adequate regulatory regime for organisms using novel 
biotechnologies is likewise appropriate for organisms using traditional biotechnologies. 
I mean to exclude from the discussion traditional animal and plant breeding tech-
niques, including those fairly recent technologies that use radiation or chemicals to in-
duce mutations in tissue cells. For the most part, I will focus on technologies that are 
capable of inserting a gene from one organism into another. Although modern biotech-
nologies may someday be used to genetically engineer farm animals, I will not focus on 
genetically engineered higher animals in this Article. Finally, I will not discuss fermenta-
tion technologies that might be used to produce agriculturally useful chemical products 
such as animal hormones, fertilizers, and animal drugs. 
One further limitation is required to keep this Article manageable. I will not analyze 
the regulation of agricultural biotechnologies by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). The clearest application of the FDA's authority to agricultural biotechnology is 
the production of pest and disease resistant plants. Pest and disease resistance is usually 
induced by breeding the plant to synthesize toxic chemicals. In large enough quantities 
such chemicals can be toxic to humans and livestock who eat the crops. There is, of 
course, a natural incentive for a plant breeder not to breed a crop that is toxic to the 
intended consumers of the crop. Although using modern genetic engineering techniques 
to breed pest and disease resistant crops clearly comes within my definition of "agricul-
tural biotechnology," I will not address the applicability of the FDA's authority to this 
problem. See generally McNamara, FDA Regulation of Food Substances Produced by 
New Techniques of Biotechnology, 42 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 50 (1987). 
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A. Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology 
Agricultural biotechnology can produce biological pesticides 
that are highly selective and therefore not as likely to cause ad-
verse environmental side effects as chemical pesticides.& Simi-
larly, microorganisms might be designed to control soil pH and 
salinity, thus effectively increasing the geographical range of 
many crops. 6 Modified bacteria may someday replace chemical 
fertilizers. Nitrogen fixing bacteria coexist symbiotically with 
certain legumes, such as soybeans, and genetic engineering tech-
niques may enhance their nitrogen fixing capabilities. Indeed, a 
company has very recently given the EPA notice of its intent to 
field test such a microorganism.7 It may even be possible to 
modify nitrogen fixing bacteria and algae to provide nitrogen for 
plants that lack a symbiotic relationship with currently existing 
nitrogen fixing bacteria. 8 
Genetic engineering techniques can help protect farm animals 
from disease. For example, scientists are attempting to design 
"subunit" vaccines to prevent viral animal diseases (such as foot 
and mouth disease and rabies) without placing the animal at 
risk of contracting the disease against which it is vaccinated.9 
Biotechnology is already beginning to yield suitable vaccines for 
bacterial animal diseases (such as scours and swine dysentery) 
which cause millions of dollars of damage annually.10 
Genetic engineering techniques can also be applied directly to 
plants to improve yields. 11 Traditional plant breeding biotech-
5. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 183-84 (1984) 
[hereinafter OTA COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT]. 
6. Id. at 180. 
7. See Crawford, BioTechnica Tests EPA Review Process, 235 SCIENCE 840 (1987); 
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Fact Sheet: EPA Receives First Notice for a Microorga-
nism Subject to Section 5 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (Feb. 6, 1987) [hereinaf-
ter EPA Fact Sheet]. 
8. OTA COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 5, at 181-82; GENETIC ENGI-
NEERING, supra note 3. 
9. See OTA COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 5, at 162-67; GAO 
USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 12. Subunit vaccines use only a few components of an 
infective organism to elicit antibodies. These components are incapable of infecting the 
host organism. 
10. OTA COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 5, at 162-67. The USDA 
has already licensed 17 products resulting from modern biotechnologies, including five 
bacterins and bacterin-toxoids to prevent scours in swine and one modified live virus 
vaccine to prevent pseudorabies in swine. Comments of David Espeseth, Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA (Apr. 9, 1987) (commenting on an earlier draft 
of this Article) [hereinafter Espeseth Comments]. 
11. Doyle, Biotechnology Research and Agricultural Stability, 2 lssuEs IN Sc1. & 
TECH. 111, 114 (1985). 
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nologies have greatly increased yields of commercially useful 
crops by selecting for plants that produce more of the commer-
cially useful plant part (e.g., tubers in the case of potatoes; seeds 
in the case of sunflowers).12 Similarly, traditional technologies 
have allowed seed companies to develop breeds that are much 
easier to harvest and process, thus reducing the ultimate ex-
pense of putting food on the table of the consumer.13 Finally, 
traditional plant breeders have been able to select for plants 
that have a higher resistance to insects, disease, and drought. 1• 
Although modern biotechnologies will not replace traditional 
plant breeding, they can be used together to "speed up and per-
fect the process of genetic refinement."111 
In addition, modern biotechnologies may be capable of achiev-
ing results that are unattainable with traditional biotechnolo-
gies. For example, genetic engineers may be able to devise new 
herbicide resistant strains of crops that facilitate minimum till-
age agriculture.16 Moreover, scientists can insert into plants 
genes from bacteria that cause the plants to produce proteins 
that are toxic to insects.17 Finally, scientists may soon be able to 
improve plant biological processes, such as photosynthesis. 18 
B. Risks of Agricultural Biotechnologies 
Although most genetically engineered microorganisms will 
probably not be dangerous, most scientists agree that some de-
liberate releases may pose health and environmental risks under 
some conditions.19 Unlike chemicals, microorganisms proliferate 
12. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS 137-39 (1981) 
[hereinafter OTA IMPACTS REPORT]. 
13. J. DoYLE, ALTERED HARVEST 58-59 (1985). It is not clear that the consumer re-
ceives the full benefit of the reduced expense. Some would argue that a great deal of the 
savings is absorbed by food processors. Id. at 352-53. 
14. GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, at 14; J. DOYLE, supra note 13, at 187; GAO 
USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 12-13. 
15. OTA IMPACTS REPORT, supra note 12, at 141. 
16. See Birenbaum, Pesticide and Herbicide Chemists Advised to Utilize Biotech 
Techniques, Genetic Engineering News, Nov./Dec. 1986, at 12, col. 1. The USDA re-
cently approved a request to field test a tobacco plant that had been genetically engi-
neered to be resistant to the herbicide atrazine. Sun, Biotech Guidelines Challenged by 
Rifkin, 233 SCIENCE 516 (1986). 
17. See Doyle, supra note 11, at 117-19; Rigi, Field Test of Gene Altered Pest Resis-
tant Plant Begins, Genetic Engineering News, Oct. 1986, at 1, col. 1. 
18. Doyle, supra note 11, at 114. 
19. A House Committee Staff report identifies the following kinds of risks posed by 
large-scale release of biotechnologies: "(1) ecological disruption due to lack of natural 
enemies; (2) infectivity, pathogenicity, or toxicity to nontarget organisms ... and (3) 
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when released into the environment. Unless the scope and con-
ditions of initial releases of genetically engineered microor-
ganisms are carefully limited, they can upset delicate ecological 
balances. 
If genetically engineered pesticides, for example, are not selec-
tive for particular pests, or if they mutate so as to lose that se-
lectivity, they can become hazardous to beneficial species or 
even to humans. One of the first genetically engineered pesti-
cides is a bacterium that lives on the roots of corn plants. A 
chemical company engineered the bacterium to secrete a chemi-
cal that kills cutworms.20 In reality, the bacterium is a pesticide 
applicator, and it apparently applies its pesticide continuously, 
whether or not the crop damaging insects are present in the 
field. Clearly, this pesticide has the potential to disrupt ecologi-
cal systems.21 Moreover, constant exposure of insects to the 
toxin will no doubt induce resistance among target insect species 
over time. 
Microorganisms designed to modify soil pH and to add nutri-
ents to the soil could cause environmental damage if they found 
a niche in soils not used for crops or if they modified the pH or 
increased the nutrient content of lakes and waterways. Such mi-
croorganisms would have to be carefully engineered to remain 
where they were most useful. 22 
Even though genetically engineered vaccines are likely to be 
safer for the host animals than current vaccines, things can go 
wrong. Live vaccines can mutate in the host into harmful or-
ganisms. 23 Two benign viruses can recombine within animal 
hosts to produce a deadly virus, although this is normally quite 
rare. It is also possible that live genetically engineered microor-
ganisms that are harmless to domestic livestock pose risks to 
wildlife. 
Any genetically engineered microorganism may be capable (ei-
ther as designed or through mutation) of attacking other micro-
exchange of genetic material with other organisms." GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, 
at 16. 
20. See Doyle, supra note 11, at 118; Sun, Monsanto May Bypass NIH in Microbe 
Test, 227 SCIENCE 153 (1985). 
21. Doyle, supra note 11, at 118. 
22. See generally GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, at 15. 
23. For example, when two nonpathogenic fungi were combined in an effort to en-
hance the nitrogen fixing capability of a species of pine tree, the combination was patho-
genic and killed seedlings to which it was applied. GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, at 
19 (citing Giles & Whitehead, Reassociation of a Modified Mycurrhza with the Host 
Plant Roots (Pinus Radiata) and the Transfer of Acetylene Reduction Activity, 48 
PLANT & SOIL 143-52 (1977)). 
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organisms, plants, and animals in unanticipated ways.24 For 
example, even a nonpathogenic genetically engineered micro-
organism might outcompete beneficial species for available food 
supplies, thereby reducing populations of beneficial species. H As 
novel genetic engineering techniques begin to produce exotic 
strains of microorganisms, it is always possible that one strain 
will find an ecological niche and cause harm to the environ-
ment. 26 Microorganisms can be quite unpredictable in complex 
ecosystems, and the histories of the introduction of exotic orga-
nisms into new ecosystems clearly demonstrate that novel spe-
cies are capable of upsetting delicate ecQlogical balances.27 In-
deed, the introduction of a genetically engineered microorganism 
into a new environment may pose greater risks than the intro-
duction of an existing exotic species because so little is known 
about novel organisms.28 Some microorganisms are "promiscu-
ous," sharing DNA with one another.29 A genetically engineered 
bacterium that was designed to secrete an enzyme under care-
fully limited conditions might exchange the gene coding for that 
enzyme with a "wild" bacterium that would then secrete the en-
zyme under different conditions and cause environmental 
damage. 
Genetically engineered plants can also cause economic and 
ecological harm if they proliferate in places where they are not 
wanted. One person's flower is another person's weed. For exam-
ple, corn is regarded as a weed in a sorghum field. The kudzu 
vine, which was imported from Japan for soil conservation pur-
poses, took over nearly every embankment in the Southeast 
United States, and then marched on to conquer trees and tele-
phone poles.30 It is remotely possible that genes in a genetically 
24. GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 13. 
25. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 83 (testimony of Elliott A. 
Norse, Director, Public Affairs Office, Ecological Soc'y of Am.). 
26. See GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, at 5. The microorganisms that cause 
dutch elm disease and chestnut blight thrived in the United States after they entered 
the country in wood imported from Asia. Environmental Implications Hearing, supra 
note 3, at 25 (testimony of Frances E. Sharples, Oak Ridge Nat'l Laboratory, Oak Ridge, 
Tenn.). 
27. Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 79-81 (testimony of Elliott A. 
Norse, Director, Public Affairs Office, Ecological Soc'y of Am.); Environmental Implica-
tions Hearing, supra note 3, at 22-28 (testimony of Frances E. Sharples, Oak Ridge Nat'l 
Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.). 
28. See generally Environmental Implications Hearing, supra note 3, at 5 (testi-
mony of Martin Alexander, Professor of Agronomy, Cornell Univ.). 
29. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL APPLICA-
TIONS OF GENETICALLY ALTERED ORGANISMS 10-11 (1986) [hereinafter OTA GENETIC ls-
SUES REPORT). 
30. See GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, at 19. 
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engineered crop species will move into weeds or other nonculti-
vated vegetation, thereby bestowing on the weed the advantage 
that the gene gave the crop species. 31 
Traditional plant breeding techniques attempt to select for 
disease and pest resistance. In many cases this is simply a mat-
ter of breeding plants that best synthesize chemicals that are 
toxic to disease-producing microorganisms and other pests. 32 
Modern genetic engineering techniques may produce crops that 
synthesize much larger quantities of such toxic substances and 
thereby render them toxic to wildlife.33 Yet many ecologists 
would probably agree that the potential for unanticipated harm 
is less for genetically engineered plants than for genetically engi-
neered microorganisms. 34 
Finally, agricultural biotechnologies may have an indirect im-
pact on the environment not immediately attributable to the 
modified plants or organisms. For example, at least one scientist 
has suggested that rather than designing weed-specific herbi-
cides, seed companies should use genetic engineering techniques 
to make several beneficial plant species resistant to herbicides.35 
Broad-spectrum herbicides could then be used to eliminate a 
wide variety of potential weed species, leaving the economically 
useful species intact. Such an approach might encourage the 
overuse of herbicides, resulting in damage to wildlife, water sup-
plies, and ultimately human beings. 36 On the other hand, it 
might encourage use of more benign herbicides that currently do 
not adequately differentiate between weeds and crops.37 
31. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 54 (prepared statement of Robert M. 
Goodman, Vice President, Research & Dev., Calgene, Inc.). Several species that are nor-
mally considered weeds, such as wild sunflowers and Johnson grass, are used as sources 
of genetic variation in plant breeding programs. Id. at 59, 63. Because crops can inter-
breed with related species of weeds, the genetic material of crops can become incorpo-
rated into weeds. 
32. See, e.g., Balandrin, Klocke, Wurtele & Bollinger, Natural Plant Chemicals: 
Sources of Industrial and Medicinal Materials, 228 SCIENCE 1154 (1985). 
33. Seed companies would probably not develop disease and pest resistant crops that 
were intended for human or animal consumption. That would, of course, be self-defeat-
ing. But many crops, such as ornamental species, are not directly consumed by humans, 
and many that are consumed by humans and livestock have uses other than human or 
livestock consumption. For example, if energy prices return to the 1970's levels, much 
corn will be grown to produce alcohol for fuel. 
34. OTA GENETIC ISSUES REPORT, supra note 29, at 11; Planned Release Hearing, 
supra note 3, at 54, 91 (prepared statement and testimony of Robert M. Goodman, Vice 
President, Research & Dev., Calgene, Inc.). 
35. See Birenbaum, supra note 16. 
36. See Doyle, supra note 11, at 119-20. 
37. Comments of Margaret Mellon, Staff Attorney, National Wildlife Federation 
(Mar. 23, 1987) (commenting on an earlier draft of this Article) [hereinafter Mellon 
Comments). 
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In sum, although the potential risks of modern agricultural 
biotechnologies are highly speculative, they are quite real. 38 If 
problems do occur, they may be severe. Thus, like nuclear power 
and some synthetic chemicals, agricultural biotechnologies pose 
low-probability, high-consequence risks, the magnitude of which 
will continue to be highly uncertain. 39 
II. THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES IN REGULATING 
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGIES 
In the past, the USDA has played a significant role in promot-
ing agricultural biotechnologies, and it will play an increasingly 
prominent role in regulating them. The Agricultural Research 
Service devotes approximately $450 million per year to agricul-
tural research, including $24.5 million in fiscal year 1986 for 
projects using modern biotechnologies. ' 0 The Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) administers several statutes 
aimed at protecting agricultural crops and livestock, consumers 
of food, and the general environment from harmful plants and 
microorganisms. 
Under the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act,41 it is unlawful to trans-
port or import a "worthless, contaminated, dangerous, or harm-
ful virus, serum, toxin, or analogous product intended for use in 
the treatment of domestic animals."42 Establishments that man-
ufacture veterinary biological products must be licensed, and 
importers must have permits.'3 The USDA has issued regula-
tions banning the shipment within the United States of individ-
ual products unless the manufacturer has satisfied USDA re-
quirements for purity, safety, potency, and efficacy.'" In effect, 
38. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 40 (prepared statement of Martin Al-
exander, Professor of Agronomy, Cornell Univ.). 
39. Environmental Implications Hearing, supra note 3, at 9 (prepared statement by 
Martin Alexander, Professor of Agronomy, Cornell Univ.); Harlow, The EPA and Bio-
technology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty, 95 YALE L.J. 553,559 (1986); 
McGarity & Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L. 
REV. 461, 486 (1983). 
40. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTECHNOLOGY: ANALYSIS OF FEDERALLY FUNDED 
RESEARCH 14 (1986). 
41. 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
42. Id. § 151. The original statute barred only the interstate shipment of harmful 
products, but the Food Security Act of 1985 expanded the USDA's authority to include 
intrastate shipments. Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1768, 99 Stat. 1654 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 151, 154-154a, 157, 159 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). 
43. 21 U.S.C. §§ 154-155 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
44. 9 C.F.R. § 113 (1987). 
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the USDA has established a licensing regime for manufacturing 
establishments, imports, and individual products. 
The Act of February 2, 1903, empowers the USDA to issue 
regulations and to take appropriate measures against the import 
or interstate transport of animal diseases.45 The USDA has in-
terpreted this statute to give it authority to require a permit for 
any import or interstate shipment of contagious or infectious 
diseases of animals.46 
The Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA)47 empowers the USDA to 
regulate imports and movement within the United States of 
plant pests, which may be microorganisms, plants, or insects. 
Any import or shipment within the United States of designated 
plant pests must have a permit.48 In addition, the Noxious Weed 
Act49 requires a permit for the importation or interstate ship-
ment of noxious weeds that have been listed by the USDA pur-
suant to somewhat cumbersome procedures.50 
Finally, the recently enacted Food Security Act111 gives the 
USDA very broad authority to "establish appropriate controls 
with respect to the development and use of the application of 
biotechnology to agriculture.''112 Although this extremely broad 
grant of authority was probably intended merely to give the 
USDA authority to protect the environment from USDA-spon-
sored research, the statute is not by its terms so limited, 53 and 
the USDA has not decided whether it will rely on the statute to 
bolster its other authorities.114 However, because the quoted sec-
45. 21 u.s.c. § 111 (1982). 
46. 9 C.F.R. § 122 (1987). 
47. 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj (1982). 
48. 7 C.F.R. § 330.200 (1987). 
49. 7 u.s.c. §§ 2801-2813 (1982). 
50. Id. § 2803. The term "noxious weed" is defined broadly to include any living 
stage of any plant that is "of foreign origin, is new to or not widely prevalent in the 
United States, and can directly or indirectly injure" crops or other "interests of agricul-
ture, including ... fish and wildlife resources." Id. § 2802(c). Because the USDA be-
lieves that it has adequate authority to regulate plants that pose risks to agricultural 
crops under the Federal Plant Pest Act, Id. §§ 150aa-150jj, and the Plant Quarantine 
Act, Id. §§ 151-167, and because the Noxious Weed Act is limited to weeds "of foreign 
origin," the agency has not relied heavily on the Noxious Weed Act in asserting its au-
thority over agricultural biotechnologies. 
51. Id. §§ 3121-3150 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
52. Id. § 3121(12). 
53. This narrower reading of the Act is supported by the fact that it does not estab-
lish any of the normal elements of a regulatory program, such as hearing procedures, 
permit requirements, penalties, and inspection authority. Telephone interview with 
Terry Medley, Director, Biotechnology and Environmental Coordination Staff, Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA (Feb. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Medley 
Interview]. 
54. Id. 
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tion of the Food Security Act amended only the National Agri-
cultural Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 / 11 
it probably does not go beyond USDA-sponsored research and 
associated regulatory programs.116 
Until very recently, the USDA did not actively exercise the 
foregoing powers because there were no proposals for large-scale 
use of modern agricultural biotechnologies.117 Recognizing that it 
will soon play a major role in regulating agricultural biotechnolo-
gies, the Department has established within the APHIS a Bio-
technology Environmental Coordination Staff that is responsible 
for coordinating the Department's regulatory activities and for 
ensuring that they are consistent with departmental policies and 
with the National Environmental Policy Act.58 
Congress transferred regulatory authority for pesticides from 
the USDA to the EPA in 1970. Under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),119 no person may dis-
tribute a pesticide unless it has been "registered" with the EPA. 
The Act defines the term "pesticide" very broadly to include any 
substance "intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or 
mitigating any pest" or "intended for use as a plant regulator, 
defoliant, or desicant."80 To obtain a registration for a pesticide, 
the registrant must demonstrate that it will not pose an "unrea-
sonable risk" to humans or the environment. 
The EPA's authority to regulate chemical substances under 
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)61 may also have a role 
in regulating agricultural biotechnology. Any manufacturer of ei-
55. Pub. L. No. 95-113, tit. 14, 91 Stat. 913, 981 (1977) (codified as amended at 7 
U.S.C. §§ 3101-3336 (1982 & Supp. IV (1986)). 
56. A. Carr, A Critique of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Policy on Biotechnol-
ogy Research and Regulation 5 (Congressional Research Serv. May 30, 1986) (paper pre-
pared at the request of the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House 
Comm. on Science and Technology); Medley Interview, supra note 53. 
57. The Department did, however, condition its research grants for projects involving 
recombinant DNA on compliance with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guide-
lines for Recombinant DNA Research. Biotechnology Regulation Hearing, supra note 3, 
at 136 (testimony of Orville G. Bentley, Assistant Secretary for Science and Educ., 
USDA). After receiving criticism from the General Accounting Office for relying upon 
the NIH guidelines, which were aimed more at biomedical than agricultural research, the 
USDA has recently issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking suggesting its own 
guidelines for agricultural research. Advanced Notice of Proposed USDA Guidelines for 
Biotechnology Research, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,367 (1986). 
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Medley Interview, supra note 
53. When fully staffed, the Biotechnology Environmental Coordination Staff will consist 
of microbiologists, plant pathologists, environmental specialists, and a program analyst 
and regulatory specialist. Id. 
59. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
60. Id. § 136(u). 
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
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ther a new chemical substance or a significant new use of an ex-
isting chemical substance must file a notice with the EPA. The 
EPA may then require that the substance be tested for adverse 
health and environmental effects, and it can prevent the manu-
facture and distribution of the substance during the testing pe-
. riod. Any time that the EPA finds that a chemical substance 
presents an "unreasonable risk" of injury to humans or to the 
environment, it may promulgate a rule regulating the manufac-
ture, distribution, and use of the substance. The EPA has inter-
preted the broad definition of "chemical substance" in the 
TSCA to include genetically engineered microorganisms, but 
this reading is not free from controversy.62 
By the early 1980's, it became clear that modern biotechnolo-
gies would play a major role in producing useful agricultural 
products. Unlike previous technologies such as the automobile or 
the video cassette recorder that were introduced into the market 
with little or no governmental interference, biotechnology al-
ready had a history of state and federal regulation at the re-
search and development stage. Biotechnology proponents there-
fore expected regulation, and they sought out the appropriate 
agencies before attempting to introduce the technologies into 
commerce. They soon discovered, however, that no single statute 
was aimed specifically at the risks of biotechnology, and they 
were frustrated to find several overlapping authorities. More-
over, the relevant agencies had given little thought to how their 
statutes might apply to biotechnology, and they had undertaken 
few efforts to eliminate gaps in coverage or to reduce overlaps. 
The Reagan administration soon formed an interagency work-
ing group, called the Domestic Policy Council Working Group on 
Biotechnology, charged with drafting an overall federal frame-
work for regulating biotechnology. The working group finished 
its job in June 1986, when it published a "Coordinated Frame-
work for Regulation of Biotechnology" and an associated group 
of agency policy statements and proposed rules.63 Concluding 
that existing statutes gave the federal government adequate au-
thority to regulate biotechnology, the working group recom-
mended against any statutory change. This Article critically ex-
amines the working group's sanguine assessment in the context 
of agricultural biotechnologies. 
62. See infra text accompanying notes 122-28. 
63. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 
(1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework]. 
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Ill. ELEMENTS OF AN ADEQUATE REGULATORY REGIME 
Before identifying the elements of an adequate regulatory re-
gime, it is worth exploring why there should be any regulatory 
regime at all for agricultural biotechnology. Inevitably, any regu-
lation of agricultural biotechnology will slow down its progress 
and thereby deprive society of its benefits. In our market-ori-
ented society, it is often presumed that there must be good rea-
sons for regulation, and those reasons can guide the search for 
the best regulatory tools. 
The primary reason for regulating agricultural biotechnology 
is to reduce the risks that at least some agricultural biotechnolo-
gies pose to humans and to the general environment. Past expe-
rience with new technologies, such as agricultural pesticides and 
nuclear power, argue against assuming that agricultural biotech-
nologies will be entirely benign. Yet society could allow the mar-
ket, through the indirect incentives of the tort system, to regu-
late agricultural biotechnology without interference from 
regulatory agencies. 
The tort system, however, is not likely to provide adequate 
incentives for reducing the risks of large-scale releases of geneti-
cally engineered microorganisms. 64 As with synthetic chemicals, 
it may be difficult to establish cause-effect relationships between 
genetically engineered microorganisms and environmental dam-
age. If experts would generally be unwilling to testify that the 
release of a microorganism "probably" caused a plaintiff's dam-
age, there would be no recovery, and hence no incentive to re-
duce risks. Even if causation could be established, the tort sys-
tem would not send an adequate message unless all injured 
persons sued and all responsible parties were subject to suit.6 ~ 
The tort system will not address harm to the environment at all 
unless the technology also causes economic damage. When the 
ecology is thrown out of balance, there may be no individual 
with a sufficient direct financial stake to finance a lawsuit. Per-
haps more importantly, the tort system generally works only af-
ter the fact; it is not well adapted to preventing harm before it 
occurs.66 
64. For an assessment of the efficacy of the tort system in controlling chemical risks, 
see McGarity, Media Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Strategies for Health and 
Environmental Regulation, 46 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 159, 173-79 (1983). 
65. See id. at 17 4-75. Many of the new agricultural biotechnology companies are 
small entities that are not highly capitalized. Bankruptcy laws effectively shield such 
companies from full responsibility for the harm caused by their products. 
66. See id. at 175-76. 
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The case for regulation is not as clear with genetically engi-
neered plants. Economic damage due to genetically engineered 
plants that become weeds is probably fairly easily established. 
Because scientists seem less concerned that genetically engi-
neered plants will cause large-scale uncompensable harm,67 the 
after the fact aspect of the tort system would be less objectiona-
ble. On the other hand, the tort system would still lack incen-
tives to reduce ecological harm that did not cause economic loss. 
Whether or not society erects a regulatory mechanism to pre-
vent harm from genetically engineered plants and microorga-
nisms is ultimately a policy question that must be informed by 
technical considerations, but not dominated by them. 68 Percep-
tions, more than scientific facts, are likely to dictate the choice. 
At this stage in the development of biotechnology, public per-
ceptions are poorly informed and ill defined. The public will 
probably insist upon a regulatory regime for microorganisms. Al-
though the question is closer, policymakers may desire to err on 
the side of safety and provide some sort of regulatory regime for 
genetically engineered plants as well. The following discussion 
assumes that the decision has been made to erect a regulatory 
regime beyond that provided by the tort system, but it recog-
nizes that the scope and intrusiveness of that regime might vary 
depending upon whether plants or microorganisms are involved. 
The elements of an adequate regulatory regime for biotechnol-
ogy set out below are not necessarily exhaustive, and an ade-
quate regulatory regime need not include every one of them. Ul-
timately, what constitutes an adequate regulatory regime is a 
policy question that Congress must resolve. 
A. Prerelease Notice 
A comprehensive regulatory regime would require manufac-
turers to inform the regulatory agency in advance of releasing a 
novel genetically engineered plant or microorganism into the en-
vironment. Such advance notification would give the agency an 
opportunity to decide whether to exercise its regulatory power. 
67. The slight possibility that genetic engineering will create a food plant that poi-
sons people is probably best addressed through traditional statutes regulating adulter-
ated food. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 342 (1982). This topic is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
68. Harlow, supra note 39, at 560; McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion 
in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in 
EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729 (1979). 
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Without prerelease notification, the agency can only assume a 
reactive mode, perhaps after harm has resulted from the release. 
The information included in prerelease notice might vary, de-
pending upon the nature of the plant or organism. For example, 
an identification of the host organism and an accurate character-
ization of the inserted DNA would seem to be the minimum in-
formation necessary. The location and circumstances surround-
ing the release are also fundamental. Beyond that, the 
information required might depend upon the suspected hazard. 
As the agency acquired more experience with classes of plants or 
organisms, less information might be required, and in time the 
entire prerelease notice might be waived for whole classes of 
plants and microorganisms. 
Beyond the obvious burden imposed by the prerelease filing 
requirements, the most significant disadvantage of prerelease 
notification is the potential that it has for revealing valuable 
trade secrets. 69 Although all federal agencies have the power to 
protect legitimate trade secrets from disclosure,70 information is 
sometimes released inadvertently; additionally, the public inter-
est often requires that the affected public be provided informa-
tion that might otherwise be considered a trade secret.11 Never-
theless, policymakers may decide that inconvenience to 
manufacturers from the risk of disclosing trade secrets is out-
weighed by the advantages of prerelease notification. 
B. Data Collection, Data Evaluation, and Risk Assessment 
An adequate regulatory regime would have some mechanism 
for producing information relevant to the health and environ-
mental effects of agricultural biotechnologies.72 Either the regu-
lated entity or the agency itself should conduct studies on surro-
gate systems in laboratories and greenhouses prior to deliberate 
69. The complicated and delicate subject of the secrecy of trade information that is 
germane to evaluating the environmental effects of new technologies is beyond the scope 
of this Article. See generally McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health 
and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 837 (1980). The inquiry here will simply focus on the authority and the ability of 
the agencies to protect legitimate trade secrets. 
70. The Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982), prohibits federal employees from 
releasing trade secrets. The Supreme Court has held that the Trade Secrets Act provides 
authority for an agency to withhold trade secret information, absent an explicit congres-
sional command to release it. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
71. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 69, at 840-48. 
72. See McGarity & Bayer, supra note 39, at 474-75. 
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release of genetically engineered plants and microorganisms into 
the environment.78 Dr. Martin Alexander, a microbial ecologist, 
has suggested that an adequate risk assessment would be based 
upon information addressed to the following four questions: 
(1) the possibility that the organism will survive follow-
ing its release, (2) the likelihood that it will multiply in 
some natural environment or in farmed areas, (3) the 
possibility that it will be dispersed and make contact 
with species that it can injure, and ( 4) the chance that it 
will be harmful. 74 
Unfortunately, there are presently no standardized guidelines 
for evaluating the potential of microorganisms to cause ecologi-
cal damage.76 At least during the first few years, protocols for 
such studies should probably be determined on a case by case 
basis, and the studies should be undertaken in carefully con-
trolled test plots. 78 
In addition to gathering data, the agency must have the ca-
pacity to evaluate the quality of those data, analyze them, and 
draw scientifically valid conclusions. These functions require 
73. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 55 (prepared statement of Robert M. 
Goodman, Vice President, Research & Dev., Calgene, Inc.) ("Introduction of new crop 
varieties requires testing in many different environments over a period of several 
years."); id. at 82 (testimony of Robert K. Colwell, Professor of Zoology, University of 
Cal., Berkeley, Cal.) (suggesting a series of questions that should be asked about geneti-
cally engineered microorganisms before they are released into the environment). 
74. Id. at 40. 
75. Environmental Implications Hearing, supra note 3, at 220 (statement of Frances . 
E. Sharples, Oak Ridge Nat'l Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.). Dr. Alexander has con-
cluded that we are lacking ail adequate body of information upon which to base 
regulation: 
What is needed, therefore, is information on the potential for survival, multipli-
cation, dispersal, and deleterious effects of the range of species of present and 
future interest to specialists in biotechnology, as well as a series of generally 
accepted tests that evaluate these phenomena . . . . It is in these two ar-
eas-developing a data base and a series of generally accepted tests-that essen-
tially nothing has happened within the past 30 months. 
Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 40-41. 
76. A statutory requirement that manufacturers of genetically engineered agricultural 
products provide the results of health and safety testing to a regulatory agency raises the 
complex question of the trade secret status of this information. Clearly, potential com-
petitors should not be allowed to use the original manufacturer's information to obtain a 
license or other governmental advantage. The regulatory regime should therefore provide 
some mechanism for protecting the original manufacturer's legitimate interest in recoup-
ing its financial investment in the information without at the same time depriving the 
appropriate regulatory agency and the public of access to data that may be essential for 
an appropriate evaluation of the safety of the product. See McGarity & Bayer, supra 
note 39, at 475-76; see generally McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 69. This Article will 
not discuss this question in detail. 
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both a mechanism for ensuring that the data are produced in 
accordance with sound scientific protocols and expertise in eval-
uating the quality of scientific information. Typically, regulatory 
agencies with data evaluation responsibilities hire a staff of qual-
ified experts. In addition, many agencies establish advisory com-
mittees composed of prominent scientists to evaluate informa-
tion and to provide advice on the soundness of the agency's 
conclusions. Some agencies also circulate important scientific 
data for peer review to scientists selected by the agency staff. 
Finally, the regulatory agency should use the information that 
it gathers to assess the risks posed by deliberate releases of agri-
cultural biotechnologies.77 At present, the art of risk assessment 
for biotechnology is very primitive indeed.78 The Ecological So-
ciety of America has testified that: 
[T]here is currently no definitive way to predict ... 
what an organism will do when modified and released 
into the environment, for two reasons. For one, because 
the genetic engineering processes are, to varying degrees, 
imprecise, we do not know precisely what the products 
will be .... The other reason is that even if genetic en-
gineers always knew precisely the nature and function of 
the genes they were transferring, it does not follow that 
they-or anyone else at this point-could then predict 
with sufficient assurance the fate and effects of the modi-
fied organism when it is released.79 
Because the risks are likely to be of the low probability, high 
consequence variety that plagues regulators in other areas, it 
may be most appropriate to assess the risks of agricultural bio-
technologies at first on a case by case basis prior to deliberate 
release.80 This would require information on the pathogenicity of 
77. See ISSUES IN FEDERAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-36 (discussing 
Advanced Genetic Science's unauthorized experiments releasing into the environment 
the 'ice-minus' microbe and suggesting several factors to be implemented by EPA in 
reviewing proposals to release genetically engineered organisms into the environment); 
Harlow, supra note 39, at 563; McGarity & Bayer, supra note 39, at 478-80. 
78. See Planned Releases Hearing, supra note 3, at 4-5; Harlow, supra note 39, at 
560-63; Stotzky & Babich, Fate of Genetically-Engineered Microbes in Natural Envi-
ronments, 7 RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL. 163 (1984). 
79. Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 81; see also Harlow, supra 
note 39, at 560-63 (pointing out the science policy aspects of risk assessments for large-
scale releases of genetically engineered microorganisms). 
80. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 19 (testimony of David T. 
Kingsbury, National Science Found.); id. at 71 (testimony of Monica Riley, American 
Soc'y for Microbiology); id. at 82 (testimony of Elliott A. Norse, Director, Public Affairs 
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the organism, its infectivity, and other possible undesirable by-
products. Next, an adequate risk assessment would apply some 
sort of model to predict the dispersion of the organism or plant 
into the environment and the potential human and environmen-
tal exposure to it. Finally, still more modelling might be neces-
sary to relate exposure to predicted harm. 
Because the early risk assessments will be highly speculative, 
the agencies should undertake to characterize the attendant un-
certainties. An agency could, for example, predict a "worst case" 
scenario and compare it with a "best case" scenario and a "most 
likely case" scenario. As the technology evolves and as more in-
formation becomes available from monitoring the technologies in 
the environment, the uncertainties should diminish, and the 
agency might be able to base regulatory decisions on generic pre-
dictions that certain classes of agricultural biotechnologies pose 
negligible or excessive risks.81 
Once the decision has been made to allow the widespread use 
of a genetically engineered plant or microorganism, the regula-
tory agency should retain the capacity to monitor for the pres-
ence of the organism in the environment to determine whether it 
has unanticipated effects. Most likely, the amenability of a mi-
croorganism or plant to environmental monitoring will have to 
be genetically engineered into it at the outset.82 Hence, the 
agency must have the authority to require the proponent of the 
technology to install this susceptibility to monitoring into the 
plant or microorganism. 
C. Risk Management 
When risk assessments suggest that particular agricultural 
biotechnologies pose unacceptable risks, an adequate regulatory 
Office, Ecological Soc'y of Am.); Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 31 (testi-
mony of Ronald Cape, Chairman of the Bd. & Chief Executive Officer, Cetus Corp.) 
(favoring a case by case approach solely as an "interim necessity"); Harlow, supra note 
39, at 555-56. But see Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 91 (testimony of Rob-
ert M. Goodman, Vice President, Research & Dev., Calgene, Inc.) (arguing that a case by 
case approach "would result in shallow and redundant studies rather than the coherent, 
broadly based academic study that is called for"). 
81. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 71 (testimony of Monica 
Riley, American Soc'y for Microbiology); Harlow, supra note 39, at 555-56. 
82. Genetically engineering a microorganism to facilitate monitoring may itself cause 
undesirable traits. For example, one of the most common techniques for facilitating 
monitoring is to design antibiotic resistance into a bacterium. Obviously, this trait is of 
concern in its own right, because it may impede efforts to destroy the organism. Mellon 
Comments, supra note 37. 
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regime must be capable of reducing or eliminating those risks. A 
wide variety of regulatory approaches exists to address the risks 
posed by dangerous technologies, ranging from outright bans to 
positive economic incentives. The general options available for 
the regulation of biotechnology have been addressed elsewhere, 
and that analysis will not be repeated here.83 
There seems to be an evolving consensus in the regulatory 
agencies, the regulated industry, and environmental groups that 
the most appropriate regulatory control for large-scale release 
biotechnology is a permit system designed to impose regulatory 
requirements on a case by case basis.8" The permitting agency 
can attach such conditions upon the manufacture, distribution, 
and use of the technology as are necessary to render the risks 
acceptable. Moreover, because genetically engineered microorga-
nisms and plants can proliferate once released into the environ-
ment, it is probably appropriate to require a permit even before 
small-scale testing of genetically engineered plants and microor-
ganisms outside of greenhouses. There is a good deal of debate, 
however, over whether the acceptability of the risk should be de-
termined by explicit reference to the technology's benefits, or 
whether it should be determined by broad reference to other 
risks that society deems acceptable. 811 
The permitting approach may have the significant disadvan-
tage of "freezing" safety-oriented controls into standard catego-
ries. This inflexibility can hinder future development of poten-
tially useful agricultural biotechnologies. "Performance" 
standards, under which proponents of a technology need only 
ensure that its uses do not violate broad indicia of health and 
environmental harm, give the proponents of technologies greater 
flexibility. But the risk assessment art is not currently suffi-
ciently sophisticated to allow an agency to arrive at precise crite-
ria for adequate performance. Even if the agency could somehow 
arrive at an "acceptable" concentration of a microorganism or 
plant in the general environment, it is not clear that current 
monitoring technologies are capable of detecting them in the en-
vironment at "unacceptable" concentrations. A case by case per-
mitting approach is probably necessary until scientists under-
83. See McGarity & Bayer, supra note 39, at 482-97. 
84. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 63, at 23,309; McGarity & Bayer, supra 
note 39, at 499-500. Under this approach, the regulatory agency would require the propo-
nent of a particular agricultural biotechnology to obtain a permit upon a showing that 
the risks of its use were not unacceptable. 
85. See generally M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, R1sK AND CULTURE (1982); L. LAVE, 
THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION (1981); W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK (1976). 
1108 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:4 
stand agricultural biotechnologies well enough to set 
performance based standards. 
D. Public Participation 
Given the controversial history of biotechnology in the labora-
tory,86 any regulatory decisions that result in a deliberate release 
of genetically engineered plants or microorganisms into the envi-
ronment should be made only with the broadest possible public 
participation. Opponents of agricultural biotechnologies can eas-
ily conjure up visions of pandemics and ecological catastrophes, 
and such images have played no small role in past debates over 
the use of recombinant DNA techniques in academic laborato-
ries.87 The not so distant memories of attempts to dismantle the 
EPA and other health and environmental agencies during the 
early 1980's suggest that we are not at a high point in public 
trust in regulatory agencies.88 To some extent, the crippling of 
the nuclear power industry after Three Mile Island is attributa-
ble to a lack of public confidence in the decisions of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission.89 To avoid a similar distrust of regula-
tors of agricultural biotechnology, representatives of the public 
must be given a direct role in the regulatory decisions. 
Public participation can be burdensome to regulatory agen-
cies, and it can delay regulatory decisionmaking. If the technol-
ogy develops uneventfully, public attention will no doubt wane 
and delays will not plague the process. But at least initially, the 
relevant regulatory agencies must make affirmative efforts to en-
sure that public interest groups and individual members of the 
public are informed well in advance of important decisions and 
are given sufficient time and opportunity to make their views 
known. If significant segments of the public are convinced that 
the regulatory process is closed to them, the technology may not 
survive in this highly pluralistic society, however vast its poten-
tial long-run benefits. 
86. N. WADE, supra note 1; Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights 
and Responsibilities: A History of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1978). 
87. See M. ROGERS, supra note 1; N. WADE, supra note 1. 
88. See J. CLAYBROOK, RETREAT FROM SAFETY (1984); J. LASH, K. GILLMAN & D. SHERI-
DAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS (1984); S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA (1983). 
89. See J. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION (1987). 
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IV. ADEQUACY OF EXISTING REGULATORY AUTHORITIES 
Having identified some important elements of an adequate 
regulatory regime for agricultural biotechnology, we shall now 
examine the existing statutory authorities to determine the ex-
tent to which they provide sufficient authority to implement an 
adequate regulatory program. At the same time, we shall ex-
amine the proposed regulatory programs for agricultural bio-
technology and ask whether the USDA and the EPA are likely 
to have the resources and, more importantly, the institutional 
willingness to implement an effective regulatory program. 
Most of the relevant statutes address particular uses of tech-
nologies or particular adverse end points. For example, the 
FIFRA90 provides authority to regulate substances intended to 
mitigate pests, but vests no authority in the EPA to regulate the 
very same substances if they are not intended for pest control. 
Similarly, the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (VSTA)91 applies only to 
biologics and microorganisms intended for use in the treatment 
of domestic animals. The Act of February 2, 1903,92 and the 
Federal Plant Pest Act93 give the USDA somewhat broader au-
thority to regulate microorganisms, plants, and other organisms 
that cause animal and plant diseases, or otherwise directly or 
indirectly damage or injure plants. It would be surprising if this 
patchwork of statutes, without the protective umbrella of a gap-
filling statute like the TSCA,94 provided adequate authority to 
protect the environment from all of the risks of agricultural bio-
technologies. Therefore, we should not be surprised to discover 
that when measured against the aforementioned elements of an 
adequate regulatory regime, there are several significant gaps 
that must be filled by the TSCA.911 Unfortunately, we shall also 
discover that the TSCA itself applies only ambiguously to agri-
cultural biotechnologies, and even under the EPA's fairly ambi-
tious interpretation of that Act, some elements of an adequate 
regulatory regime are still missing. 
90. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
91. 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
92. Id. § 111 (1982). 
93. 7 u.s.c. §§ 150-150jj (1982). 
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
95. Of course, any existing statutory gaps need not be filled at all, if the policymaker 
believes that the risks posed by agricultural biotechnologies do not warrant a complete 
regulatory regime. For reasons identified in Part 1(8) supra, however, the public will 
probably not knowingly accept an incomplete regulatory process for these new 
technologies. 
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A. Prerelease Notification 
1. Genetically engineered microorganisms- The current 
statutory authorities for regulating genetically engineered micro-
organisms vary somewhat from those that address genetically 
engineered plants. In addition, the risks posed by microorga-
nisms may not be the same as those posed by plants. The follow-
ing analysis will therefore distinguish between microorganisms 
and plants. 
a. Pesticides- The FIFRA provides that a pesticide may 
not be sold, distributed, or received by any person unless the 
pesticide is registered with the EPA.96 The EPA would necessa-
rily be informed of any lawful uses of genetically engineered mi-
croorganisms that were intended to kill or mitigate pests. Even 
experimental uses of potential pesticides must have a permit 
from the EPA.97 For example, the EPA has recently issued an 
experimental use permit for a genetically engineered organism 
intended to replace a bacterium that facilitates frost 
formation. 98 
96. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1982). 
97. Id. § 136a(b)(2). The EPA may issue an experimental use permit allowing a po-
tential registrant to gather data sufficient to obtain a full registration. Id. § 136c (Supp. 
IV 1986). In theory, the EPA must be made aware of all experimental uses. The Agency, 
however, has in the past exempted uses of unregistered pesticides on less than 10 acres 
from the experimental use permit requirement. 40 C.F.R. § 172.3 (1987). Nevertheless, 
in light of the novelty of genetic engineering, the EPA has decided to make the exemp-
tion inapplicable to microorganisms deliberately formed to contain genetic material from 
dissimilar source organisms and microorganisms containing genetic material from a simi-
lar source if any source organism is a pathogen. With one exception (for combinations in 
which the genetic material added to the recipient microorganism consists only of well-
characterized, non-coding regulatory regions), such organisms will be subject to EPA re-
view prior to any release pursuant to an experimental use permit. A "well-characterized, 
non-coding regulatory region" is a region on the DNA molecule that has been studied in 
sufficient detail so that it is known with a high degree of certainty that the region does 
not code for the production of a protein, peptide, or functional RNA molecules. See U.S. 
Envtl. Protection Agency, Statement of Policy; Microbial Products Subject to the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 
51 Fed. Reg. 23,313, 23,332 (1986) [hereinafter EPA Policy Statement]. All other geneti-
cally engineered pesticides will be subject to an abbreviated review prior to the issuance 
of an experimental use permit. Nonengineered microorganisms that are not pathogens 
and that are not indigenous will likewise be subject to abbreviated review. Only indige-
nous nonengineered nonpathogens may be released without any review at all. Id. at 
23,316. Depending upon the quality of the review, this approach may be sufficiently pro-
tective. But see infra text accompanying notes 130-31 (criticizing the exemption for in-
tergeneric transfers of well-characterized, non-coding regulatory regions). 
98. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas, 637 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1986); 
ISSUES IN FEDERAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-36. 
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b. Veterinary biological products- Under the VSTA as 
amended by the Food Security Act of 1985,99 the USDA has es-
tablished a permit program for all viruses, serums, and toxins 
intended for use in the treatment of domestic animals. 100 A per-
son may not import, distribute, or ship such "veterinary bio-
logics" unless produced in a licensed establishment under a 
USDA product license. To obtain a license, the USDA must be 
satisfied that the product is safe for the treated animals, 
humans, and the environment. Thus, the USDA should obtain 
prerelease notification of all commercial uses of veterinary 
biologics. 
The USDA has recently proposed regulations providing for 
prerelease notice of experimental releases of potential veterinary 
biologics as well. The USDA's current regulations prohibit the 
unauthorized use of "experimental biological products"101 in fa-
cilities that are licensed for the production of biological prod-
ucts,102 and they prohibit the interstate shipment of experimen-
tal products without authorization, 103 but they do not currently 
regulate the experimental use of a potential product in a labora-
tory that is not a facility licensed to produce biologics.10" The 
Department's recently proposed rules prohibit intrastate ship-
ment of any unlicensed biological product for experimental use 
in animals, except that the USDA may authorize such shipments 
for testing in a limited number of animals.106 
Although old veterinary biologics must generally be prepared 
in a licensed facility, the recent amendments to the. VSTA, 
which gave the USDA authority over intrastate shipment, also 
provide that the Department shall by regulation exempt from 
the licensing requirement biologics prepared by a person or cor-
99. Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1404, 99 Stat. 1544 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3121 (Supp. IV 
1986)). 
100. The USDA's current regulations, 9 C.F.R §§ 101-123 (1987), apply only to veter-
inary biologics that are intended for import or use in interstate commerce, but the Food 
Security Act of 1985 amended the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act to give it authority over veter-
inary biologics intended for use in intrastate commerce. The USDA has recently an-
nounced its intention to amend its regulations to reflect this new authority. Final Policy 
Statement for Research and Regulation of Biotechnology Processes and Products, 51 
Fed. Reg. 23,339 (1986). 
101. The term "experimental biological product" is defined as "a biological product 
which is being evaluated to substantiate an application for a product license or permit." 
9 C.F.R. § 101.3(b) (1987). 
102. Id. § 103.1. 
103. Id. § 103.3. 
104. Telephone interview with David Espeseth, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service, USDA (Feb. 19, 1987) [hereinafter Espeseth Interview]. 
105. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,975, 41,977 (1986) (proposed amendments to 7 C.F.R. § 103.3). 
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poration: (1) solely for administration to animals of that person 
or companies, (2) solely for administration to animals by a li-
censed veterinarian, or (3) solely for distribution pursuant to an 
approved state licensing program. The regulations still prevent 
the shipment of any worthless, contaminated, dangerous, or 
harmful product, and producers of products containing live or-
ganisms must still provide any information the Department may 
require to assess the product's safety and effects on the environ-
ment.106 But the Department would not necessarily receive no-
tice of shipments of exempted products in intrastate commerce. 
Clearly, the first two exemptions leave a potentially large gap 
in the USDA's notice requirements. The USDA would not neces-
sarily receive notice of the preparation and shipment of an unli-
censed veterinary biological by a company for experiments in its 
own animals; nor would it receive notice of an unapproved ship-
ment and use by a licensed veterinarian as part of a treatment 
for a diseased animal. These exemptions may well undermine 
the otherwise applicable notice requirement for intrastate ship-
ment of genetically engineered biologicals for experimental pur-
poses. Because the USDA has not promulgated implementing 
regulations for the first (and potentially most important) exemp-
tion, it remains to be seen whether the prerelease notice aspect 
of the regulatory regime for veterinary biologicals is adequate. 
Finally, there has been some ambiguity in the USDA's approach 
to testing veterinary biologics in animals outside the confines of 
a laboratory. Early statements by responsible officials indicated 
that the agency did not regard testing in an animal to be a "re-
lease" of a genetically engineered microorganism into the envi-
ronment, even if the animal was not within an enclosed build-
ing.107 The Department's recently proposed regulations for 
experimental uses of animal biologics108 and more recent state-
ments of agency officials, 109 however, indicate that the agency 
will receive notice and have an opportunity to disapprove of any 
unexempted shipment of animal biologics for experimental 
purposes. 
c. Animal diseases- Under the Act of February 2, 1903, and 
the VST A, the USDA has established a permit regime for the 
import and interstate transport of all organisms that "may in-
troduce or disseminate any contagious or infectious disease of 
106. Id. at 41,975, 41,978 (proposed amendments to 9 C.F.R. § 107.1). 
107. Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 267-68; A. Carr, supra note 
56, at 13. 
108. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,975 (1986). 
109. Espeseth Comments, supra note 10. 
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animals (including poultry)."110 Although this requirement could 
ensure that the USDA is made aware of all imports and inter-
state transports of genetically engineered microorganisms, three 
aspects of the permit program cast considerable doubt on its 
adequacy. 
First, the permit requirement as written only applies to inter-
state transport of genetically engineered microorganisms or vec-
tors of such microorganisms. The Department's authority under 
the Act of February 2, 1903 extends only to interstate commerce. 
Although the Department's authority under the Virus-Serum-
Toxin Act has been extended to intrastate commerce, it is un-
clear whether that statute applies to organisms that are not in-
tended to cure diseases in animals. Even if that statute could be 
read so broadly, the agency has not amended its regulations to 
require permits for intrastate transport of microorganisms that 
might cause animal diseases. Thus, for example, the USDA 
would not necessarily become aware of inoculations of cattle 
with a genetically engineered microorganism derived from some 
deadly human or animal virus, as long as the responsible person 
did not propose to take the microorganism across state lines. 
Second, the permit requirement is limited to organisms that 
"may" cause animal diseases, and this important threshold find-
ing may be difficult to make in the abstract. Apparently, no 
prerelease testing is required to determine whether an organism 
"may" cause an animal disease and therefore be subject to regu-
lation. The Department has not attempted to assemble a list of 
animal pathogens as it has proposed for plant pests;m rather, it 
tends to focus exclusively upon particular diseases for which 
Congress has established quarantine programs.112 The USDA 
would generally not be aware of the creation of a novel organism 
that could cause animal diseases, unless informed by the 
manufacturer. 113 
Third, the permit requirement is only tangentially relevant to 
microorganisms that may be dangerous to wildlife. A permit 
would probably not be required for a microorganism that caused 
an infectious disease only in reptiles. The regulations by their 
110. 9 C.F.R. § 122.l(e) (1987). 
111. See infra text accompanying notes 119-22. 
112. Telephone interview with William Ketter, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service, USDA (Feb. 26, 1987) [hereinafter Ketter Interview]. These official programs 
typically are created at the behest of the affected industry. The USDA devotes the bulk 
of its attention to writing permits for the import of animals that might be diseased. Id. 
113. Id. 
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terms apply to diseases of all "animals (including poultry),"11• 
but the program's primary focus is clearly upon commercially 
valuable species. 
d. Plant pests- Under the FPPA, 1111 the USDA has estab-
lished a permit regime for microorganisms, plants, and other or-
ganisms that "can directly or indirectly injure or cause disease 
or damage in any plants or parts thereof. "116 Such organisms 
cannot be imported into or transported in the United States 
without a permit.117 The Department may refuse to issue a per-
mit when "such movement would involve a danger of dissemina-
tion" of plant pests.118 
As part of the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Bio-
technology, the USDA has promulgated regulations governing 
manufacturers and importers of genetically engineered microor-
ganisms that may be plant pests.119 The USDA has defined "reg-
ulated article" to include 
[a]ny organism which has been altered or produced 
through genetic engineering, if the donor organism, recip-
ient organism, or vector, or vector agent belongs to any 
genera or taxa designated in [a long list of designated or-
ganisms] and meets the definition of plant pest, or is an 
unclassified organism and/or an organism whose classifi-
cation is unknown, or any product which contains such 
an organism, or any other organism or product altered or 
produced through genetic engineering which the Deputy 
Administrator determines is a plant pest or has reason to 
believe is a plant pest.120 
114. 9 C.F.R. § 122.l(e) (1987). 
115. 7 U.S.C. § 150aa-150jj (1982). 
116. Id. § 150aa(c). 
117. Id. § 150bb(a). 
118. Id. § 150bb(b). 
119. Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic 
Engineering Which are Plant Pests or Which There is Reason to Believe are Plant Pests, 
52 Fed. Reg. 22,892 (1987) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 330, 340) [hereinafter Intro-
duction of Organisms]. 
120. Id. at 22,908. The definition explicitly excludes "recipient microorganisms which 
are not plant pests and which have resulted from the addition of genetic material from a 
donor organism where the material is well characterized and contains only non-coding 
regulatory regions." Id. 
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The list includes a large proportion of agriculturally oriented 
hosts and vectors. 121 A permit is required before "regulated arti-
cles" may be released into the environment.122 
The quoted definition of "regulated article" represents a sig-
nificant retrenchment from the definition that the USDA origi-
nally proposed in 1986.123 Under the proposed definition, a ge-
netically engineered organism or product would be a "regulated 
article" if the host or vector was on the list. The Agency as-
sumed that such organisms and products "can directly or indi-
rectly injure" plants. This broad, but quite reasonable, interpre-
tation of the words "can directly or indirectly injure" would 
have included organisms that have not caused any harm in the 
past but that could injure crops in the future. 124 The USDA thus 
proposed a generic rule identifying a broad class of genetically 
engineered microorganisms that could injure plants in the future 
if appropriate conditions were not placed on their movement 
through the permit process. 
The legislative history of the FPP A indicates that Congress 
did not mean to require a high degree of certainty before em-
powering the USDA to protect plants. The House Report 
stressed the need to supplement existing quarantine statutes, 
because they did not "provide authority to regulate the move-
ment into or through the United States of insects that might 
later be found to be injurious to cultivated crops. " 1211 It is, there-
fore, unlikely that a court would have overturned the USDA's 
cautiously broad reading of its own statute. At least one com-
pany apparently acquiesced in the USDA's authority to require 
prerelease notice of genetically engineered organisms that are on 
its plant pest list,126 and the Industrial Biotechnology Associa-
121. Medley Interview, supra note 53. For example, most researchers use a plasmid 
from a listed organism to transfer genes to agriculturally related microorganisms in their 
recombinant DNA research. Id. In addition, the "reason to believe" catchall phrase is 
meant to encompass a broad variety of potentially harmful activities based on scientific 
information, such as biological data and toxonomic association. Id. 
122. Id. The term "release into the environment" is defined very broadly to include 
"(t]he use of a regulated article outside the constraints of physical confinement that are 
found in a laboratory, contained greenhouse, or a fermenter or other contained struc-
ture." Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,908-09. 
123. Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,896. 
124 The USDA has adopted this broader reading in the past to require permits for 
microorganisms that might cause damage, even when they have not been proven to do so. 
See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 145 (testimony of Karen Darling, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg. & Inspection Servs., USDA). 
125. H.R. REP. No. 289, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957). 
126. A company has requested a permit to field-test a genetically engineered microor-
ganism that may have an enhanced capacity to fix nitrogen for legumes. Crawford, supra 
note 7, at 840; EPA Fact Sheet, supra note 7. 
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tion suggested that "only an obtuse interpretation of the 
[FPPA] could lead one to conclude that USDA does not have 
the authority to determine whether a novel organism is a plant 
pest."121 
Nevertheless, many companies objected that the USDA could 
not presume that a genetically engineered organism or product 
might be a plant pest simply because the host or vector came 
from the list. In their view, the USDA could not require a per-
mit absent an independent determination that the organism or 
product met the statutory definition of plant pest. The USDA 
acquiesced in this narrower view of its authority, and in the final 
rule, it defined "regulated article" to include only organisms and 
products containing listed hosts and vectors that also met the 
statutory definition of "plant pest." 
Although it is certainly true that the USDA has no authority 
under the FPP A to regulate organisms and products that do not 
meet the statutory definition of "plant pest," its proposed ge-
neric approach was a sensible and lawful tool for implementing 
the "can directly or indirectly injure" test of the statutory defi-
nition. The narrower definition of "regulated article" in the final 
regulations begs the critical question of who makes the indepen-
dent "plant pest" determination. Because the USDA has no way 
of knowing whether a novel organism has been created until a 
permit has been requested, it is apparent that in virtually all 
cases, the creator of the new organism will be responsible for 
making the "plant pest" determination. And because the USDA 
has no authority to require testing for adverse health or environ-
mental effects until someone has applied for a permit, the crea-
tor is apparently free to make the independent "plant pest" de-
termination based on whatever data it deems appropriate. The 
long list of hosts and vectors is thus merely a guideline to manu-
facturers of genetically engineered organisms and products. The 
net result is that the USDA cannot be certain that it will receive 
prerelease notice of all genetically engineered organisms and 
products that might harm plants. As a practical matter, the 
USDA may discover the existence of a genetically engineered 
plant pest onl);' after it has caused damage.128 
127. Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 163. 
128. Another substantive weakness of the notification system is a relatively impor-
tant exemption for "non-pathogenic" organisms that have resulted from the addition of 
genetic material that is "well characterized" and contains only "non-coding regulatory 
regions." Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,908. This exemption appears 
to apply to such well-known hosts as Bacillus subtilis and some forms of Escherichia coli, 
two workhorses of recombinant DNA biotechnology. The Department would not necessa-
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It should be noted, however, that the final rule does not neces-
sarily leave a gap in authority to provide prerelease notification. 
To the extent that the USDA does not receive notification, the 
EPA should receive a premanufacture notification under the 
TSCA.129 Hence, by narrowing its own jurisdiction, the USDA 
has simply broadened the EPA's jurisdiction. To the extent that 
the EPA has the scientific expertise to evaluate the potential of 
genetically engineered organisms and products to harm plants 
and to the extent that manufacturers who determine that their 
organisms and products do not meet the "plant pest" definition 
understand that they must still give prerelease notification to 
the EPA, this may be acceptable. Whether one applauds or con-
demns the USDA's final rule, therefore, depends upon one's 
faith in the relative abilities of the USDA and the EPA to pro-
tect the environment without unduly inhibiting new 
technologies. 
e. Other uses- Genetically engineered microorganisms that 
would- not be regulated under any of the foregoing authorities 
may be subject to regulation under the TSCA, which provides 
for premanufacture notification to the EPA of all new "chemical 
substances.m3o The EPA has taken the position that microorga-
nisms, other than those specifically exempted by statute, 131 are 
chemical substances.132 This author has argued elsewhere that 
although the DNA within microorganisms can reasonably be 
characterized as a chemical substance, the EPA may be going 
too far in calling the entire microorganism a chemical sub-
stance. 133 In any event, the EP A's position is subject to legal 
rily be made aware of the introduction of exempted organisms, unless the responsible 
person applied for a courtesy permit pursuant to the proposed regulations. Id. at 22,913. 
For a critique of the same exemption under the TSCA, see infra text accompanying 
notes 130-31. 
129. See infra text accompanying notes 130-52. There is, however, a potential gap if 
manufacturers look only to the USDA list and do not realize that even if they do not 
employ hosts and vectors on the list, they are still subject to TSCA premanufacture 
notification. 
130. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1982). A chemical substance is a ."new" chemical substance if 
it is not on the inventory of chemical substances that the EPA has compiled under 
§ 8(b) of the Act. Id. § 2607(b). 
131. The statute exempts from the definition of "chemical substance" substances 
that are manufactured, processed, or distributed for use as pesticides, foods, food addi-
tives, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices. Id. § 2602(2)(B)(ii), (vi). The intent here 
was clearly to prevent overlap with the FIFRA and the FDA's regulatory authorities. 
132. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,324. 
133. McGarity & Bayer, supra note 39, at 506; see also Coordinated Framework 
Hearing, supra note 3, at 66 (testimony of Monica Riley, American Soc'y for Microbi-
ology) (describing the EPA's interpretation as "strained"). 
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challenge. m Perhaps out of concern for what might replace the 
current regulatory regime if the TCSA were held to be inappli-
cable to genetically engineered microorganisms, the biotechnol-
ogy industry has not objected to the EP A's expansive reading of 
its statute. 
The EPA has adopted a system for prerelease notification 
under the TSCA that mirrors the system that it has adopted 
under the FIFRA. The EPA will require prerelease notification 
for all microorganisms resulting from intentional, intergeneric 
combinations of genetic material, except those in which the 
transferred material is only a well-characterized, non-coding reg-
ulatory region. Microorganisms resulting from intrageneric com-
binations of genetic material are not considered to be "new" 
chemical substances and are, therefore, not subject to the stat-
ute's premanufacture notification requirements. 
The EPA's rationale for these distinctions does not coincide 
well with the statutory language, but one of the exemptions may 
be compelled by practical necessity. A "new" chemical substance 
is defined by statute to be a substance that is not on the inven-
tory of existing substances that the EPA compiled pursuant to 
section 2607(b) of the TSCA.1311 The EPA has included on this 
inventory a generic category of all "unprocessed," naturally oc-
curring substances.136 "Naturally occurring" organisms are those 
that "(1) exist as a result of natural events or processes, or (2) 
have been developed as a result of limited manipulation of natu-
ral processes."137 Hence, the EPA has historically taken the posi-
tion that the products of traditional breeding techniques are not 
"new chemical substances," even though the DNA may never 
have existed before as a chemical substance. The Agency has ex-
tended this logic to conclude that the products of intrageneric 
gene transfers accomplished through modern biotechnologies are 
not "new" chemical substances. The rationale for this position is 
largely administrative practicality-the Agency might otherwise 
be overwhelmed with premanufacture notices for relatively triv-
ial transfers that pose no known risks to humans or to the envi-
ronment. The Agency believes that such microorganisms have a 
very low probability of exhibiting new combinations of traits.138 
134. McGarity & Bayer, supra note 39, at 506. 
135. 15 u.s.c. § 2602(9) (1982). 
136. 40 C.F.R. § 710.4(b)(l)(i) (1987). 
137. Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Policy Regarding Certain Microbial 
Products, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,880, 50,888 (1984) [hereinafter Microbial Products]. 
138. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,317-18. 
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The Agency does, however, have plans to deal with in-
trageneric transfers of genetic material when the host organism 
is a pathogen or the transferred material is from a pathogen. 
Even though the EPA has concluded that such an organism 
would not be a new chemical substance, it plans to issue a "sig-
nificant new use rule" under section 5(a)(2) 139 that would re-
quire the manufacturer to make the EPA aware of any planned 
releases, even in small field tests, except to the extent that the 
microorganism would already be subject to USDA review as a 
plant pest or animal pathogen.140 This accommodation should 
adequately address the most dangerous of the products of in-
trageneric transfers. 
The EP A's exclusion of microorganisms resulting from inter-
generic combinations in which the transferred material is only a 
well-characterized, non-coding, regulatory region is less compre-
hensible.141 Having concluded that it would be administratively 
feasible to include most intergeneric combinations, it is not 
likely that the excluded combinations would substantially ease 
the administrative burden. The Agency argues that such trans-
fers present a "special case," because "[w]here only regulatory 
material is transferred, no distinctly new combinations of traits 
are introduced; instead, existing traits in the receiving microor-
ganisms are amplified or changed quantitatively."142 For this 
reason, the EPA concludes that the microorganisms are not new, 
even though they contain DNA from an entirely different genus. 
This explanation is entirely unconvincing. Amplifying existing 
traits can have a very large impact on the characteristics of an 
organism from the standpoint of the receiving environment. For 
example, a microorganism may secrete a material that is toxic to 
seeds only during the first six hours of its existence, when it is 
not likely to come into contact with seeds. Transferring regula-
tory material that makes the organism synthesize the material 
throughout its lifetime might cause economic and environmental 
damage if the organism did come into contact with seeds later in 
its life cycle. In addition, an organism can be quite "novel," even 
though it is the product of an intrageneric transfer of only a 
well-characterized, non-coding, regulatory region: 
139. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(2) (1982). 
140. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,328-29. 
141. The following critique applies equally to the same exemption under the FIFRA, 
supra note 97, and the FPPA, supra note 128. 
142. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,325-26. 
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The major concern about engineered organisms is their 
novelty. The manipulation of regulatory elements-start 
and stop signals and modulators of the rate at which 
genes are synthesized-could conceivably introduce a sig-
nificant degree of novelty that is independent of dissimi-
larity of gene products or pathogenicity. Even though the 
genetic engineer in such circumstances is confined to the 
same set of structural genes, he can use the regulatory 
elements to turn those genes on and off in different se-
quences, and to produce gene products in different 
amounts and in combinations with other gene products. 
The result could be an organism with a high degree of 
novelty.143 
The EPA has also taken steps to demand prerelease notifica-
tion of experimental uses of genetically engineered microorga-
nisms, despite statutory restrictions on its ability to intrude into 
research and development activities. Section 5(h)(3) of the 
TSCA exempts from the premanufacture notification require-
ments manufacturing and processing chemical substances "in 
small quantities (as defined by the Administrator by rule)" 
solely for the purpose of scientific experimentation or research 
and development. The EPA has proposed to avoid this limita-
tion by determining that no small-scale release of a genetically 
engineered microorganism for experimental purposes would be a 
release of a "small quantity," because microorganisms can pro-
liferate in the environment.144 
A more difficult hurdle is the fact that the premanufacture no-
tification requirements apply only to manufacturing or process-
ing substances for "commercial purposes."145 Purely academic 
experimentation with no commercial purpose is exempt. Al-
though any academic research sponsored by the federal govern-
ment would be subject to the NIH guidelines, 146 deliberate re-
leases into the environment in connection with privately · 
sponsored academic research apparently could proceed without 
the EPA's knowledge. This is a potential gap in coverage,1" the 
143. Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 53 (testimony of Margaret 
Mellon, Director, Toxic Substances Program, Environmental Law Inst.). 
144. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,330. 
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(i) (1982). 
146. National Insts. of Health, Recombinant DNA Research: Proposed Revised 
Guidelines, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,368 (1981); see supra note 57. 
147. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Comments on Proposal for a Coor-
dinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology 22 (Apr. 15, 1985) [hereinafter 
NRDC Comments]. 
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significance of which depends upon the extent to which aca-
demic researchers plan deliberate releases in the future. 148 
The EPA has attempted to avoid overlapping regulatory re-
quirements by exempting from TSCA review genetically engi-
neered microorganisms that will be adequately reviewed by the 
USDA.149 Thus, microorganisms intended solely for use as 
animal biologics and those subject to the FPPA's permit re-
quirements would be exclusively regulated by the USDA. The 
EPA does plan to use the TSCA as a gap-filling authority, and 
to the extent that no other agency claims authority over geneti-
cally engineered microorganisms, the manufacturer may have to 
file a premanufacture notice with the EP A. 1110 To be on the safe 
side, it would probably be desirable at first for manufacturers to 
file notices with both the EPA and the USDA. 1111 The EPA and 
the USDA plan to meet frequently to address questions of over-
lapping authority. 1112 
2. Genetically engineered plants- The regulatory regime 
currently in place for plants that might pose risks to the envi-
ronment is not extensive. On its face, it is limited to plants that 
are plant pests or noxious weeds. Whether these two categories 
encompass all genetically engineered plants that might pose en-
vironmental risks is debatable. 
a. Plant pests and noxious weeds- As we have seen, the 
FPP A establishes a permitting regime for "plant pests." That 
term is defined to include, inter alia, "bacteria, fungi, other par-
asitic plants or reproductive parts thereof . . . or any organisms 
similar to or allied with any of the foregoing ... which can di-
rectly or indirectly injure or cause disease or damage in any 
plants or parts thereof."163 The Noxious Weed Act164 also estab-
lishes a permit system for the movement of "noxious weeds," 
which are defined to include: 
148. For example, universities often establish privately sponsored research "insti-
tutes" that might well come within this gap in coverage, because the research would not 
necessarily be in pursuit of any particular commercialization plan. See M. KENNEY, BIO-
TECHNOLOGY 42-54 (1986). 
149. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,317. 
150. See id. at 23,318; Medley Interview, supra note 53. 
151. In a recent case, the manufacturer of the genetically engineered bacterium with 
enhanced nitrogen fixing capabilities filed both a premanufacture notice with the EPA 
and a request for a Plant Pest Act permit with the USDA. Crawford, supra note 7, at 
840; see EPA Fact Sheet, supra note 7. See generally IssuEs IN FEDERAL REGULATION 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 79 (describing overlapping authority). 
152. Medley Interview, supra note 53. 
153. 7 U.S.C. § 150aa(c) (1982) (emphasis added). 
154. Id. §§ 2801-2813. 
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any living stage . . . of any parasitic or other plant of a 
kind, or subdivision of a kind, which is of foreign origin, 
is new to or not widely prevalent in the United States, 
and can directly or indirectly injure crops, other useful 
plants, livestock, or poultry or other interests of agricul-
ture ... or the fish and wildlife resources of the United 
States or the public health. uui 
As we have seen, the USDA's regulatory regime under the 
FPPA would put the USDA on notice of any movement of "reg-
ulated articles" for commercial or experimental purposes.1116 The 
USDA's recent regulations define "regulated article" to include 
listed plants that have been genetically engineered, and any 
plants that have been genetically engineered through the use of 
a listed vector or that contain genes from a listed plant or micro-
organism, as long as they independently meet the statutory defi-
nition of "plant pest." Because the listed vectors include virtu-
ally all of the vectors that are currently used in recombinant 
DNA biotechnologies, this very broad definition of "regulated 
article" potentially includes most genetically engineered 
plants. 1117 
A large measure of the breadth of the definition of "regulated 
article," insofar as it applies to plants, is due to the inclusion of 
listed vectors. If other technologies for inserting foreign DNA 
into plant cells, such as micropipetting, become available, genet-
ically engineered plants that are not listed and do not receive 
DNA from listed organisms may not come within the definition 
of "regulated article," and they will fall outside of the USDA's 
notice requirement. 
More importantly, the definition of "plant pest" in the FPPA 
is limited to "parasitic plants" or other organisms similar to or 
allied with parasitic plants. The only reference to plants that are 
plant pests in the statute is a reference to parasitic plants. The 
USDA has tacitly acknowledged this limitation in its list of po-
tential plant pests, which contains only parasitic plants. A man-
ufacturer of a genetically engineered plant, who under the final 
regulation must make an independent "plant pest" determina-
155. Id. § 2802(c). 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17. 
157. Comments of Michael Lidsky, Regulatory Specialist, Biotechnology and Envi-
ronmental Coordination Staff, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA (Apr. 
22, 1987) (commenting on an earlier draft of this Article) [hereinafter Lidsky Com-
ments]; Comments of Edward Raleigh, Manager, Biotechnology Regulatory Affairs, E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co. (Apr. 6, 1987) (commenting on an earlier draft of this Article) 
[hereinafter Raleigh Comments]. 
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tion, could make a very persuasive case for the proposition that 
genetically engineered plants that are not parasites are not plant 
pests. 168 
The Noxious Weed Act establishes a similar regulatory regime 
for the importation and interstate transport of noxious weeds, 
but it requires the Department to promulgate a list of noxious 
weeds for which permits are required. There must be an oppor-
tunity for a public hearing before a plant is added to the list, 
and a plant may not be added unless the Department deter-
mines that the plant meets the definition of noxious weed and 
"that its dissemination in the United States may reasonably be 
expected to have, to a serious degree, any effect specified in [ the 
definition of 'noxious weed']."169 This latter limitation, which is 
contained in another section of the statute, may have the practi-
cal effect of precluding the Department from establishing a 
broad precatory permit system for nonparasitic plants that may 
cause damage to crops or wildlife. 160 The Department has not 
attempted to erect a regulatory program under its Noxious 
Weed Act authority for genetically engineered plants. 161 Ac-
knowledging that it does not generally act to stop the spread of 
a noxious weed until the weed has done some economic damage, 
the Department has not stressed the Noxious Weed Act in 
describing its statutory authority. 162 
Absent any comprehensive permitting process, it seems clear 
that the Department will not receive prerelease notification of 
all genetically engineered plants; nor will it even -receive prer-
elease notice of all genetically engineered plants that may turn 
out to be plant pests or noxious weeds. 163 The regulatory regime 
158. The USDA could perhaps argue that genetically engineered nonparasitic plants 
might come within the definition of "plant pest" because they are "similar to or allied 
with" parasitic plants. This argument is only plausible if there is some factual basis for 
concluding that genetically engineering a nonparasitic plant through a listed vector or by 
inserting DNA from a listed organism may turn the nonparasitic plant into a plant simi-
lar to or allied with a parasitic plant. The author is unaware of any factual information 
(or even reasoned speculation) that would support such an inference. 
159. 7 u.s.c. § 2809 (1982). 
160. See NRDC Comments, supra note 147, at 26. 
161. The USDA has received and approved one application for a permit to release a 
genetically engineered tobacco plant into the environment for experimental purposes. 
GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 38. Because the tobacco plant was not likely to be 
a plant pest, the USDA issued an opinion letter under the FPPA indicating that field-
testing the plant would not cause the introduction or dissemination of plant pests. 
162. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 149 (testimony of Karen 
Darling, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg. & Inspection Servs., USDA). 
163. See Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 177-79 (colloquy between Rep. 
Volkmer and John Patrick Jordan, Adminstrator, Cooperative State Research Serv., 
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is, therefore, inadequate for this purpose.164 Whether the poten-
tial risks of genetically engineered plants, which in the opinion 
of most experts are not as high as the risks of genetically engi-
neered microorganisms, warrant a more thorough notice require-
ment is a matter for congressional attention. 
b. Applicability of the TSCA to plants- The EPA has ap-
parently recognized that it would have to stretch the words 
"chemical substance" beyond recognition to apply the TSCA to 
genetically engineered plants. 1611 Hence, the EPA cannot provide 
the gap-filling role for genetically engineered plants that it pro-
poses to play for genetically engineered microorganisms. Any 
gaps in the USDA's authorities are likely to be gaps in all regu-
latory authority. 
B. Data Collection, Data Evaluation, and Risk Assessment 
1. Genetically engineered microorganisms- Once again, it 
is appropriate to distinguish between genetically engineered mi-
croorganisms and genetically engineered plants in evaluating the 
adequacy of existing authorities for collecting and evaluating 
data and assessing risks. 
a. Pesticides- To obtain a pesticide registration, the poten-
tial registrant must supply extensive information to the EPA on 
the pesticide's identity, its environmental fate, its potential tox-
icity to humans and other animals, and its potential for ecologi-
cal disruption. 166 Although the state of the risk assessment art 
for genetically engineered microorganisms is still too primitive 
to know definitively if the tests that the EPA requires will pro-
vide adequate data, they are a satisfactory starting point, and 
they should serve as a guide to other agencies. 
The foregoing registration requirements do not apply to ex-
perimental uses of pesticides. Because even small-scale experi-
mental uses of genetically engineered microorganisms might re-
sult in the proliferation of pathogenic organisms, however, a 
rudimentary risk assessment may be necessary before experi-
mental uses are allowed. The Agency's statute provides for "ex-
USDA, in which Dr. Jordan admits that the USDA will not receive prerelease notifica-
tion of all genetically engineered plants). 
164. See NRDC Comments, supra note 147, at 26. 
165. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,324. 
166. The EPA has promulgated requirements for testing microbial pesticides, and 
these are constantly being reexamined to meet changing needs. 40 C.F.R. §§ 158.165, 
158.170, 162.163 (1987). 
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perimental use permits" for this limited purpose.167 Although 
the Agency has in the past exempted from the experimental use 
permit requirements applications of a pesticide to less than ten 
acres of land or one acre of water, 168 the Agency has determined 
that genetically engineered microorganisms should not have a 
complete exemption, even for such limited applications. The 
EPA has therefore decided to require potential registrants to 
submit at least some information prior to any experimental use 
of genetically engineered pesticides.169 The Agency has, however, 
distinguished between one class of pesticides that the Agency 
believes warrants particularly close attention and all other ge-
netically engineered pesticides. 
Pesticides formed by deliberately combining genetic material 
from organisms of different genera, and genetically engineered 
pesticides derived from source organisms that are pathogens, 
must undergo so-called "Level 11" review before the EPA de-
cides whether to require an experimental use permit for small-
scale releases. Level II review requires the submission of fairly 
extensive information on the identity of the microorganism, its 
genetic composition, the survivability of the host organism, its 
potential for genetic exchange with wild microorganisms, its pes-
ticidal activity, the location of the test, and the differences be-
tween the test site and the natural habitat of the host organ-
ism.170 Although it is difficult to tell whether the information 
that the EPA requires is sufficient for a preliminary determina-
tion of risk, it is an important first step. 
All other genetically engineered pesticides must undergo only 
"Level I" review, which requires much less extensive informa-
tion, prior to small-scale field testing. The EPA has only thirty 
days to review a Level I application. If it makes no objection 
within that time period, small-scale experimental use is permit-
ted. The EPA has determined that genetically engineered micro-
organisms that do not involve the exchange of genetic informa-
tion across genera are not sufficiently likely to result in new 
combinations of traits to warrant a high degree of attention. 
Therefore, it does not require the same amount of information 
for such pesticides. Indeed, the Agency has concluded that most 
potential registrants should have to go to no extra effort to se-
cure the information necessary for Level I review. 171 
167. 7 U.S.C. § 136c (1982). 
168. 40 C.F.R. § 172.3(a) (1987). 
169. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas, 637 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1986). 
170. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,321-24. 
171. Id. at 23,321. 
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In sum, it appears that the EPA has the ability to gather ex-
tensive information on all genetically engineered pesticides prior 
to sale or use in commerce and prior to large-scale testing. In 
addition, the Agency plans to gather fairly extensive data on 
most genetically engineered pesticides prior to small-scale test-
ing. The only possible weakness in the scheme is the reduced 
data requirements for determining whether full experimental 
use permits will be required for Level I pesticides. It is not very 
likely, however, that this weakness will prove very important, 
because the vast majority of genetically engineered pesticides 
will probably be derived from some organisms that are 
pathogens. 172 
The EPA is slowly assembling a staff with expertise in evalu-
ating the information that the companies will be submitting for 
registrations and experimental use permits. The EPA currently 
devotes approximately ten staff persons with training in micro-
bial ecology, microbiology, and plant pathology to reviewing 
data on genetically engineered pesticides, and that number may 
well expand as demand for data reviews increases.173 
Although the Agency will develop a full record for each deci-
sion to grant a full registration for a pesticide, it does not com-
pile a full record for all experimental use permits. The Agency 
has, however, agreed to provide a written scientific position for 
each Level II proposal that identifies potential problems or sig-
nificant unanswered questions after soliciting comments from a 
work group in the EPA and from other federal agencies. 174 Fi-
nally, if an application for an experimental use permit raises 
"complex or controversial scientific questions,"1111 the Agency 
will provide its notification package and its scientific evaluation 
to a group of independent scientists constituted as a subpanel of 
its existing Scientific Advisory Panel for pesticides, and some 
questions may, in turn, come under the scrutiny of the agency-
wide Biotechnology Scientific Advisory Committee. 176 The thor-
ough review that the EPA undertook in connection with its deci-
sion to approve an experimental use permit for the "ice minus" 
bacterial pesticide indicates that the EPA has the capacity to 
evaluate the scientific information that is necessary to an in-
172. Raleigh Comments, supra note 157. 
173. Telephone interview with Fred Betz, Supervisory Biologist, Hazard Evaluation 
Division, Office of Pesticides Programs, EPA (Nov. 25, 1987). 
17 4. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,322. 
175. Id. at 23,323. 
176. Raleigh Comments, supra note 157. 
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formed decision.177 Whether the Agency will subject future pes-
ticides to such extensive review remains to be seen. 
Although the EPA is currently sponsoring some research into 
risk assessments for genetically engineered pesticides, it has not 
developed satisfactory risk assessment models to use in evaluat-
ing permit applications. It is unclear how the EPA will deter-
mine the risks of a particular release. At present, the Agency has 
adopted a case by case approach to assessing the risks of indi-
vidual permit applications, the critical elements of which are the 
scientific and policy judgments of the EP A's staff. Thus, 
whether or not an adequate regulatory regime exists for evaluat-
ing industry-submitted data and assessing risks for genetically 
engineered pesticides depends upon the co:nfidence that one has 
in the scientific integrity and policy judgment of the EP A's 
personnel. 
b. Veterinary biological products- The USDA has estab-
lished fairly elaborate testing requirements for veterinary bio-
logics to ensure that products meet the statutory criteria for pu-
rity, safety, potency, and efficacy.178 In particular, "Master 
Seed" of bacteria, viruses, or other microorganisms must be ap-
proved by the USDA for use in the manufacture of veterinary 
biologics. Primary cell lines used for the production of Master 
Seed must be tested to demonstrate that they are free of bacte-
ria, fungi, mycoplasma, viruses, and other extraneous agents. 
Tumorigenicity and oncogenicity tests must be conducted on cell 
lines if direct or indirect evidence indicates that the cell may 
induce malignancies in the species for which the product is in-
tended.179 The regulations do not explicitly require testing if 
there is no such evidence.180 Most products must be tested in 
mice for seven days to detect any adverse effects, 181 and they 
must also undergo specific field tests.182 
The USDA does not propose to treat genetically engineered 
veterinary biological products differently from products pro-
duced through other means. It has promised to evaluate each· 
177. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas, 637 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1986). 
178. 9 C.F.R. § 113 (1987); see Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 
126 (testimony of Karen Darling, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg. & Inspection 
Servs., USDA). 
179. 9 C.F.R. § 113.52(h) (1987). Indirect evidence might come from required and 
host animal tests for other purposes. Espeseth Comments, supra note 10. 
180. In practice, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service in the USDA refers 
biologics that might leave residues in beef or milk to the Food Safety and Inspection 
Service for further input. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104. 
181. 9 C.F.R. § 113.33(b)(l) (1987); Espeseth Interview, supra note 104. 
182. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104. 
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product on a case by case basis, and it may require additional 
tests when live microorganisms are present in the biological 
products.183 
Although the USDA's regulations prohibit the shipment of ex-
perimental biologics without a license, the Department has not 
followed the EPA's lead in promulgating special regulations gov-
erning licenses for experimental uses of veterinary biologics. The 
Department proposes to deal with license applications on a case 
by case basis. Typically, the Department requires biologics to be 
tested in controlled field settings, subject to quarantines, prior 
to licensing a product.184 Whether this approach is adequate de-
pends almost entirely upon the degree of confidence one has in 
the officials in charge of experimental use licensing. 
The USDA currently has a staff of seven veterinarians and 
one biometrician to evaluate biologic license applications. The 
staff also includes two persons with Ph.D.'s in microbiology, and 
one of these has had recombinant DNA research experience. 
Three of the veterinarians have Masters degrees in microbiology 
or related fields. The Department also hopes to employ an envi-
ronmental scientist in the near-future to prepare environmental 
assessments for license applications.185 This staff currently han-
dles a workload of approximately 150 license applications per 
year.1ss 
The USDA has created no formal mechanism for peer review 
of information submitted in connection with license applica-
tions.187 However, the USDA staff refers questions on licensing 
data to a separate staff at a USDA laboratory in Ames, Iowa. 
That laboratory performs separate tests to confirm the data 
prior to licensing new products.188 Finally, data supporting any 
permit applications for live recombinant microorganisms and en-
vironmental assessments for such permits must be submitted to 
a recently established Veterinary Services Biotechnology Com-
183. Id.; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Final Policy Statement for Research and 
Regulation of Biotechnology Processes and Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,336, 23,340 (1986) 
[hereinafter USDA Policy Statement]. 
184. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104. The Department's chief concern is that a 
modified live organism that is used to convey immunity to such organisms does not re-
vert over several generations to the virulent form. So far, such a reversion to a virulent 
form has never been documented. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. The USDA has granted a total of 70 establishment licenses and approxi-
mately 1500 product licenses for veterinary biologics. Coordinated Framework Hearing, 
supra note 3, at 125 (testimony of Karen Darling, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg. 
& Inspection Servs., USDA). 
187. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104. 
188. Id. 
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mittee, 189 but this committee is primarily engaged in reviewing 
broad policy questions, rather than individual data submissions. 
The current data requirements for veterinary biologics seem 
adequate for products produced through conventional tech-
niques. Whether they are adequate for genetically engineered bi-
ologics depends on the validity of the USDA's assumption that 
their risks do not differ significantly from those of conventional 
biologies and on the ability of USDA officials to detect individ-
ual instances where more testing is necessary. 
The USDA has not developed generic risk assessment meth-
odologies for veterinary biologics. In practice, the Department 
relies heavily upon small-scale field tests. If the biologic has any 
adverse effects on the test animals, it will probably not be li-
censed. The agency conducts periodic follow-up studies of 
treated animals to determine if a biologic causes side effects in 
sensitive subpopuiations.19O 
The Department has devoted little attention to risks that vet-
erinary biologics might pose to nontarget wildlife species. It be-
lieves that the host species is usually the most susceptible spe-
cies to the microorganism that is the target of the vaccine, 
because most microorganisms have a limited host range. How-
ever, the Department will generally require data to evaluate host 
range for live genetically engineered vaccines before approving 
field trials.191 Tests in laboratory rodents increase the Depart-
ment's confidence in the results of the small-scale tests. Finally, 
even assuming that a nontarget species was affected by a bio-
logic, the most likely outcome would be that the nontarget 
animal would be immunized against the target microorganism.192 
The Department does, however, plan to consider effects on 
nontarget species to some extent in preparing environmental as-
sessments for genetically engineered biologics.193 
c. Animal diseases- The USDA does not require applicants 
for permits for interstate transport of microorganisms causing 
animal diseases to undertake any particular testing regime;10• 
nor has the USDA identified models for assessing the risks of 
particular microorganisms.196 The USDA has not even published 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Espeseth Comments, supra note 10. 
192. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104. 
193. Lidsky Comments, supra note 157. 
194. Ketter Interview, supra note 112. 
195. The USDA does conduct its own tests for imported microorganisms and vectors 
of microorganisms at its Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory in Plum Island, 
New York. See USDA Policy Statement, supra note 183, at 23,341. 
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a list of microorganisms that are known to cause diseases in ani-
mals. Although such a list would not necessarily be definitive, it 
could aid genetic engineers by making them aware of hosts and 
vectors that might be suspect. As the regulations now read, it is 
apparently up to the manufacturer or transporter to determine 
whether its genetically engineered microorganism is capable of 
causing disease in animals, and the USDA's regulations do not 
prescribe any procedures for finding out whether a genetically 
engineered microorganism should be so characterized. To the ex-
tent that the manufacturer does not voluntarily produce data, it 
will not be forthcoming. This aspect of the USDA's regulatory 
regime is entirely inadequate as a mechanism for evaluating the 
capacity of genetically engineered microorganisms to cause dis-
eases in animals. Once again, the EPA will have to use its TSCA 
powers to play a gap-filling role. 
d. Plant pests- The current regulatory regime for ordinary 
plant pests does not contain any data-gathering requirements. 196 
Agency scientists, in reviewing permit applications, rely primar-
ily upon an extensive world literature on plant pests.197 The 
literature is examined for pests of wild plants, as well as for 
pests of domestic crops.198 Because the USDA has in the past 
authorized the movement of plant pests only for experimental 
purposes,199 it is probably understandable that the Department 
has not specified particular data-gathering requirements for per-
mits. The USDA's recent regulations requiring permits for "reg-
ulated articles,"200 however, has required the Department to im-
plement new information gathering requirements for genetically 
engineered microorganisms. 
To obtain a permit under the proposed regulations, the appli-
cant must submit descriptions of the expression of the modified 
organism, the purpose for its introduction into the environment, 
the country or locality of origin of the donor organism, and the 
processes, procedures, and safeguards that would be used to pre-
vent contamination, release, and dissemination of donor or-
196. The applicant for a permit must submit information about the nature of the 
pest, the method of shipment, and mitigation measures, but this information is usually 
readily available without additional data gathering efforts. 7 C.F.R. § 330,201 (1987). 
197. Telephone interview with Arnold Foudin, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service, USDA (Mar. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Foudin Interview]. 
198. Id. 
199. See Microbial Products, supra note 137, at 50,901. The USDA does allow some 
movement of plant pests for nonexperimental purposes. For example, some beneficial 
biocontrol agents are also plant pests, but the Department still issues permits for them 
because their benefits outweigh the risks. Foudin Interview, supra note 197. 
200. See supra text accompanying notes 115-24. 
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ganisms, recipient organisms, and vector or vector agents into 
the environment.201 The proposed regulations do not, however, 
require any specific testing for potential damage to plants or an-
imals. The Department will consult the world literature on the 
potential pathogenicity of the host organism and its ability to 
survive in particular environments, but there are no standard 
protocols for evaluating the potential pathogenicity of particular 
microorganisms, and the Department has no plans to design any 
protocols. 202 
The Department may require additional testing on a case by 
case basis. Although such testing requirements will focus pri-
marily upon crop plants, such tests may well reveal risks to 
other wild plants.203 The USDA will probably not, however, re-
quire specific tests to evaluate risks posed to wild plants, unless 
something in the current literature suggests a reason for doing 
so.20• 
The proposed regulations give no indication of the nature of 
the risk assessment that the agency will employ in issuing per-
mits. Despite criticism for failing to support risk oriented re-
search, 2011 the Department has not developed any risk assessment 
models, and agency scientists are unaware of any models for pre-
dicting plant pathogenicity of genetically engineered microorga-
nisms. 206 USDA scientists intend to apply their own experience 
on a case by case basis to determine the pathogenic potential of 
particular regulated articles. 207 
The USDA employs nine professionals to evaluate permit ap-
plications. Most are specialists in plant pathology, but the group 
also includes a microbiologist and a geneticist.208 The staff eval-
uates between one and three applications per week, but most of 
the applications involve easily evaluated permits for movement 
of pests from one place to another, rather than for deliberate 
releases into the environment. 209 Because the agency expects a 
"tidal wave" of permit applications in the near future, it is at-
201. Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,911. 
202. Foudin Interview, supra note 197. 
203. Id.; Medley Interview, supra note 53. 
204. Foudin Interview, supra note 197. 
205. See infra text accompanying note 255. 
206. Foudin Interview, supra note 197. 
207. Id. 
208. Id.; see also Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 126-27 (testi-
mony of Karen Darling, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg. & Inspections Servs., 
USDA) (describing overall resources available to the USDA for plant protection and 
quarantine). 
209. Foudin Interview, supra note 197. 
1132 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:4 
tempting to boost its staff to at least twenty-five professionals.210 
Whether that number will be sufficient remains to be seen. 
If a permit application raises no questions that cannot easily 
be answered by USDA staff and if it raises no "controversial" 
scientific questions, the permit decision is made without peer re-
view. When peer review is necessary, the question is referred to 
a "parent committee," composed of scientists drawn from across 
the Department, for advice. 211 The recently established Depart-
mentwide Agriculture Biotechnology Recombinant DNA Advi-
sory Committee is also available to offer scientific advice for ge-
netically engineered plants and microorganisms. 212 
e. Other uses- The TSCA gives the EPA authority to re-
quire manufacturers of chemical substances to make information 
available to the Agency for risk assessments. The EPA has inter-
preted the premanufacture notification requirement, discussed 
previously,213 to give it authority to require companies to submit 
a minimum data base to allow the Agency to determine whether 
it should object to the distribution of the substance during the 
ninety-day period that the Agency has to evaluate the 
premanufacture notice. 214 On the assumption that, in the ab-
sence of data to the contrary, all microorganisms may present a 
risk because of their potential to reproduce and exhibit new 
traits, the Agency requires general background information on 
the source organism and some limited test data on the organism 
indicating its potential for survival, replication, dissemination, 
and genetic exchange with other organisms.2111 In addition, man-
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 111-17 (testimony of 
Orville Bentley, Assistant Secretary for Science & Educ., USDA); Planned Release 
Hearing, supra note 3, at 55 (testimony of Robert M. Goodman, Vice President, Re-
search & Dev., Calgene, Inc.) (describing scientific resources available to the USDA). 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34. 
214. To place genetically engineered microorganisms on its inventory, the EPA re-
quires specific information on the organisms, including source organisms, methods used 
to manipulate source organisms, and the special functions obtained by the manipulation. 
In addition, the EPA requires manufacturers to submit information on deliberately re-
leased microorganisms relevant to risk assessment, including the purpose and intended 
effect of the application, site of application, numbers of microorganisms and methods of 
application, containment and mitigation measures, and monitoring. EPA Policy State-
ment, supra note 97, at 23,327. 
215. Id.; see Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 133 (testimony of 
John Moore, Assistant Adm'r for Pesticides & Toxic Substances, EPA). The authority 
for this stance is 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b)(2) (1982), which requires manufacturers to submit 
with their premanufacture notices data that show that the substance will not present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or to the environment. The EPA plans to require 
similar data under a significant new use rule for microorganisms that are the products of 
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ufacturers have a duty, independent of any EPA request, to 
maintain records of "significant adverse reactions to health or 
the environment" alleged to have been caused by a chemical 
substance, and the EPA may inspect such records. 216 
Beyond acquiring this minimum data set, the Agency also has 
authority to prevent the distribution and use of a chemical sub-
stance that is the subject of a premanufacture notice, pending 
the development of additional information. The EPA may do so 
if it determines that "the information available to the [Agency] 
is insufficient to permit a reasoned evaluation" of its health and 
environmental effects, and either the substance may present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment in the 
absence of such information, or the substance will be produced 
in substantial quantities and may reasonably be anticipated to 
enter the environment in substantial quantities or there may be 
significant human exposure to the substance.217 It may be rela-
tively easy for the Agency to make such determinations early in 
the evolution of agricultural biotechnologies because any signifi-
cant release of a genetically engineered microorganism into the 
environment will ultimately be produced in substantial quanti-
ties and enter the environment in substantial quantities. 
A major weakness in this data-gathering authority is the pro-
cedure that the Agency must use if a manufacturer is not coop-
erative. The order prohibiting or limiting the use of the sub-
stance pending required testing does not become effective for 
thirty days, during which time the manufacturer may file objec-
tions. If an objection is filed, the order does not go into effect, 
and the Agency must sue in a federal district court for an in-
junction to prohibit or limit the use of the substance, pending 
the submission of the required information.218 This ponderous 
process provides a great disincentive to issuing data-gathering 
orders.219 
Because the EPA's TSCA implementation program has in the 
past been exclusively devoted to regulating chemicals, the EPA 
intrageneric transfers of genes from a pathogen to a nonpathogen or of genes from a 
nonpathogen to a pathogen. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,330. 
216. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c) (1982). 
217. Id. § 2604(e). 
218. Id. § 2604(e)(B)-(C). 
219. See NRDC Comments, supra note 147, at 21. The EPA also has broad authority 
to require testing of chemical substances under § 4 of the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2603 
(1982), but this authority has rarely been exercised, and it will not be available in any 
event until the microorganism is already out in the environment. Still, it does provide 
authority for the EPA to require follow-up data gathering after the microorganism has 
been released. 
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does not presently have a large staff of people trained in evalu-
ating the risks of genetically engineered microorganisms. At this 
point the Office of Toxic Substances includes two microbial ge-
neticists, two molecular biologists, two microbial ecologists, and 
one plant pathologist.220 The Agency has established a Biotech-
nology Scientific Advisory Committee to provid,e technical ad-
vice, and it plans to supplement its staff with experts from other 
government agencies, academia, and other independent sources 
to help in evaluating the quality of health and safety data for 
genetically engineered microorganisms. 221 
The EPA has not crafted any particular risk assessment mod-
els for biotechnology. The Agency has suggested that some of 
the risk assessment approaches that it has found useful for 
nonengineered microbial pesticides will be relevant to geneti-
cally engineered microorganisms, but it acknowledges that these 
models may have to be adapted to address special problems. 222 
Although it has developed a research plan to identify risk assess-
ment models for biotechnology,223 the Agency has adopted a case 
by case approach to risk assessment in the near term. 22" 
2. Genetically engineered plants- The FPP A provides an 
adequate regime for plants that are plant parasites, with the ca-
veats already mentioned in connection with microorganisms.225 
For other genetically engineered plants, only the Noxious Weed 
Act is available. Although that statute would allow the USDA to 
require information about a noxious weed prior to obtaining a 
permit to transport it, there is no vehicle for forcing the manu-
facturer of a genetically engineered plant to run tests to deter-
mine whether it is likely to be a noxious weed. 226 The Depart-
ment has taken no action to require submission of information 
220. Telephone interview with Mark Segal, Senior Scientist, Chemical Review and 
Evaluation Branch, Health and Environmental Review Division, Office of Toxic Sub-
stances, EPA (Dec. 19, 1987); Telephone interview with Jane Rissler, Director, Biotech-
nology Division, Office of Toxic Substances, EPA (Mar. 10, 1987). 
221. This built-in flexibility to change the scope of regulation as more knowledge is 
gained about genetically engineered plants and microorganisms is critical, but it must be 
exercised in a public forum. The matter is important enough to warrant notice and com-
ment rulemaking procedures. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,328. 
222. Id. 
223. See Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 160-61 (testimony of John 
Moore, Assistant Adm'r for Pesticides & Toxic Substances, EPA). 
224. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,328. 
225. See supra text accompanying notes 196-207. If the USDA is correct in interpret-
ing "plant pest" broadly to include nonparasitic plants, see supra text accompanying 
note 158, then the regime comes much closer to the ideal for genetically engineered 
plants. As previously discussed, however, this ambitious interpretation is not likely to 
withstand judicial challenge. 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 159-62. 
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about genetically engineered plants that are not on its existing 
list of noxious weeds except for those weeds that are parasitic 
plants. The current regulatory regime is, therefore, unable to 
regulate adequately nonparasitic plants. 
C. Risk Management 
1. Genetically engineered microorganisms- Just as it is ap-
propriate to distinguish between plants and microorganisms in 
assessing risks, it makes sense to draw the same distinction in 
deciding how society will manage those risks. Different technolo-
gies are available to reduce the risks of plants and microorga-
nisms, and different techniques are available to avoid unneces-
sary exposures. 
a. Pesticides- The licensing system for pesticides is the 
EP A's primary risk management tool. The operative legal docu-
ment is the label on the licensed pesticide. The EPA manages 
pesticide risks primarily through its initial licensing decisions 
(and some fairly rare pesticide cancellation actions) and through 
conditions that are specified on the pesticide label. 227 
Less stringent regulatory controls apply to experimental use 
permits. Although the EPA must approve Level II small-scale 
testing, an applicant for a permit for a small-scale Level I test 
may commence testing after thirty days if the EPA does not ob-
ject. The EPA has promulgated no specific regulatory criteria for 
granting experimental use permits for genetically engineered mi-
croorganisms, electing instead to deal with applications on a case 
by case basis. 228 As it acquires more experience with such permit 
applications, the Agency should attempt to identify generic cri-
teria and attempt to make the process more standardized. 
b. Veterinary biological products- Like the pesticide risk 
management regime, the statutory mechanism for veterinary bi-
ologics relies heavily upon a license system. The USDA has very 
few constraints on its authority to condition establishment and 
product permits on compliance with safety related requirements. 
The USDA also has in place a regime for authorizing experimen-
tal uses of veterinary biologics. Although the Department will 
license a biological product when it is shown that the benefits of 
227. For example, the EPA can specify on the label that a pesticide may only be used 
by applications that are certified by the EPA or the states. 7 U.S.C. § 136(b) (1982). 
228. See NRDC Comments, supra note 147, at 18-19. 
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particular uses outweigh the risks, 229 it takes the position that 
any risk is unacceptable if a safer substitute exists.230 In addi-
tion, the Department attempts to impose management practices 
that minimize any remaining risks. 231 Except for the previously 
discussed exemption for intrastate use of experimental biologies 
in nonlicensed facilities, the USDA regime seems to provide ade-
quate risk management authority. 
c. Animal diseases- The permit regime for animal diseases 
gives the USDA open-ended authority to condition permits upon 
safety precautions. The regime would therefore be adequate for 
agricultural biotechnologies if it were capable of defining the 
universe of microorganisms to which it applied. As we have 
seen, 232 however, the regulatory regime for animal diseases does 
not contain any prerelease testing requirements. Until the 
USDA becomes aware of the disease-causing propensities of a 
genetically engineered microorganism, the permit requirement is 
essentially irrelevant. As a practical matter, the USDA is not 
likely to discover that a genetically engineered microorganism is 
capable of causing animal disease until it has already caused 
some damage. Moreover, it is not clear that the Department will 
aggressively use its authority to protect noncommercially useful 
species, such as reptiles or insects. 
d. Plant pests- The Department has adopted a permitting 
approach for managing the risks of genetically engineered micro-
organisms that are plant pests. Although the FPP A is not ex-
plicit as to the standard to be applied in awarding permits for 
the transport of plant pests, the Department has taken the posi-
tion that no risks to plants should be allowed unless they can be , 
adequately managed.233 For example, even when benefits out-
weigh risks, the Department insists, to the extent possible, that 
risks be mitigated. 234 For example, the permitting officers at-
tempt to ensure that microorganisms contain some kind of 
"switch" that allows them to be "turned off'' if they are found to 
cause environmental harm.23~ Although the permit officers con-
sider risks to noncrop species in meeting the Department's obli-
gations under the National Environmental Policy Act and the 
Endangered Species Act, they take a "realistic" anthropocentric 
229. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. See supra text accompanying notes 194-95. 
233. Foudin Interview, supra note 197. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
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view.236 In light of the Agency's excellent track record with re-
spect to managing the risks involved in the importation of 
known plant pests, the approach should be adequate for micro-
organisms that come within the definition of "regulated article" 
in the new regulations. 
The USDA's recently promulgated regulations, however, con-
tain a provision that could potentially undermine the "gap-fill-
ing" function of the TSCA. The regulations allow the USDA to 
issue a "courtesy permit" for genetically engineered microorga-
nisms "which are not subject to regulation under [the regula-
tions] to facilitate movement when the movement might other-
wise be impeded because of the similarity of the organisms to 
other organisms regulated under [the regulations]."237 An appli-
cation for a courtesy permit need not include any particular 
data; it need only include a "statement explaining why [ the ap-
plicant] believes the organism or product does not come within 
the definition of regulated article."238 Although the courtesy per-
mit may be a reasonable technique for avoiding unnecessary re-
view under the FPP A, it should not serve as a vehicle for avoid-
ing premanufacture notification under the TSCA. Despite the 
EP A's commendable attempt to coordinate with the USDA, it 
should take the firm position that a "courtesy permit" issued by 
the USDA does not relieve a manufacturer of its obligation to 
file a premanufacture notification with the EPA under the 
TSCA and to comply with any testing requirements that the 
EPA imposes. 
e. Other uses- The EPA can manage the risks of the re-
maining agricultural uses of genetically engineered microorga-
nisms under its TSCA authority to protect the environment 
from unreasonable risks of chemical substances. Unlike the 
FIFRA and the agricultural statutes, however, the TSCA does 
not erect a permitting regime. After submitting a premanufac-
ture notice and waiting ninety days, a company is free to manu-
facture, distribute, or use a chemical substance until the EPA 
promulgates a rule prohibiting, limiting, or otherwise regulating 
its use. 
The Agency may at any time issue a rule under section 6 of 
the TSCA imposing the least burdensome of seven listed re-
quirements if the Agency has a "reasonable basis to conclude" 
236. Id. For example, if a genetically engineered microorganism posed risks only to 
dandelions, the Department probably would not deny a permit. Id. 
237. Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,913. 
238. Id. 
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that a chemical substance's manufacture, distribution, or use 
"will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the en-
vironment."239 The listed requirements range from a prohibition 
on the manufacturing, distribution, or use of the substance to a 
requirement that it be labelled.2" 0 If the EPA's initial assess-
ment of the information submitted with a premanufacture noti-
fication provides a "reasonable basis to conclude" that the sale, 
distribution, or use of a chemical substance "will present an un-
reasonable risk of injury to health or the environment" before a 
section 6 rule can be promulgated, the Agency may issue a rule 
imposing roughly the same requirements that could be imposed 
under section 6 prior to initial release of the substance. In either 
case, the burden is on the EPA to justify any conditions that it 
places on the distribution and use of the substance. As a practi-
cal matter, it is considerably more difficult for the EPA to jus-
tify the imposition of requirements upon a substance that has 
not yet been introduced into the environment under the TSCA 
than it is under the FIFRA or the agricultural statutes. Hence, 
the EPA has adequate risk management authority only to the 
extent that it vigorously polices premanufacture notifications 
and devotes considerable resources to seeking injunctions in dis-
trict court when the information that accompanies a 
premanufacture notification is inadequate.241 Nevertheless, the 
EPA has resisted suggestions that the TSCA be amended to give 
the Agency more complete authorization power.242 
2. Genetically engineered plants- Parasitic genetically en-
gineered plants come within the previously discussed regulatory 
regime for plant pests. The Noxious Weed Act establishes a per-
mit process for plants determined to be "noxious weeds." As dis-
cussed, however, the current regulatory regime will not reach all 
genetically engineered plants, because it lacks a mechanism for 
prerelease testing. 
D. Public Participation 
1. Genetically engineered microorganisms- Although there 
is no obvious reason why the public should be less interested in 
genetically engineered plants than in genetically engineered mi-
239. 15 u.s.c. § 2605 (1982). 
240. Id. § 2605(a). 
241. See supra text accompanying notes 213-24. 
242. Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 132 (testimony of John 
Moore, Assistant Adm'r for Pesticides & Toxic Substances, EPA). 
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croorganisms, the current statutes generally provide for greater 
public participation in the regulation of microorganisms than 
plants. 
a. Pesticides- Under the FIFRA, the EPA must publish no-
tice in the Federal Register of each application to register new 
products or new uses of existing products. The public then has 
thirty days to comment on the application. 243 Although the stat-
ute does not provide for public participation in the experimental 
use permit process, the EPA has voluntarily allowed public par-
ticipation in those applications for experimental use permits 
that may have "regional or national significance."24• Unfortu-
nately, most of the information upon which the EPA bases its 
experimental use permit and registration decisions is shielded 
from public scrutiny until the EPA has completed its decision-
making process. Potential registrants almost always claim that 
their health and safety data constitute "trade secrets" that' are 
protected from public disclosure. 245 Although the statute re-
quires the release of health and safety data to the pub-
lic-despite trade secrecy claims-after the EPA has made a fi-
nal registration decision,246 the public can have access to such 
data prior to the registration decision only if the registrant is 
willing to share them with the public. Although some of the 
early applicants for experimental use permits have commenda-
bly forsworn their trade secrecy claims, there is no guarantee 
that they will continue to do so in the future. Insofar as regis-
trants are unwilling to share safety related information with the 
public prior to registration, the public participation provision of 
the current regulatory scheme for pesticides is inadequate. 
Once the EPA decides, perhaps on the basis of alleged trade 
secret information, to grant registration for a pesticide, there 
need be no public hearing before the product enters com-
merce. 247 Environmental groups seeking to challenge the factual 
or legal basis of a registration decision must appeal to a federal 
district court. 248 
b. Veterinary biological products- The current USDA reg-
ulations for licensing veterinary biological products and estab-
243. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(4) (1982). 
244. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,323. Apparently the Agency, at its 
sole discretion, makes the determination whether an experimental use permit is of "re-
gional or national significance." 
245. See supra note 76. 
246. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(2) (1982). 
247. This contrasts starkly with the absolute right of the applicant for a pesticide 
registration to demand a hearing if the EPA denies registration. Id. § 136a(c)(6). 
248. Id. § 136n(a). 
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lishments do not provide for any public participation in the li-
censing decisions, and the USDA's recent policy statements 
suggest no role for the public apart from the right to comment 
upon any environmental impact statements. The Agency, in fact, 
has no provision for making the public generally aware of appli-
cations for product licenses or for permits to conduct field 
tests.249 Although most significant field tests will probably re-
quire an environmental assessment, the assessment will not nec-
essarily reveal the test site,2110 or be available to the public in 
time for effective public comment prior to release. 2111 The regime 
for animal biologics is therefore utterly inadequate with respect 
to public participation. 
c. Animal diseases- There are no provisions for making the 
public aware of, or for allowing public participation in, USDA 
decisions to permit the interstate transport of animal diseases. 
Thus, the USDA regulatory regime is inadequate from the 
standpoint of public participation. 
d. Plant pests- Neither the existing regulations for licens-
ing the import and transport of ordinary plant pests nor the new 
regulations for "regulated articles" provide for any public aware-
ness of, or participation in, licensing decisions beyond the op-
portunity to read and comment upon the Agency's environmen-
tal assessments. 2112 Any other information relevant to the 
decision, such as any studies required of the permittee, may be 
requested under the Freedom of Information Act (subject to its 
exemption for confidential business information),2113 but will not 
routinely be made available to the public. 211• Reacting to several 
negative comments on its proposed rules,2511 however, the USDA 
has adopted a procedure for petitioning the Agency to include or 
249. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104. 
250. Id. 
251. The USDA plans to give the public 30 days to comment on environmental im-
pact assessments. Espeseth Comments, supra note 10. It is not clear that 30 days is 
enough time for members of the public to provide written responses to environmental 
assessments. Much will depend upon the thoroughness of the assessments themselves. 
252. Foudin Interview, supra note 197. 
253. In the past, most biotechnology companies have claimed virtually all of the in-
formation submitted to be trade secrets. Id. 
254. Id.; see Statement of Assemblyman Lloyd Connelly, Before the USDA, Sacra-
mento, Cal. (July 29, 1986) (complaining that his staff was told by the USDA that he 
would have to file a Freedom of Information Act request to discover what genetically 
engineered products the Department had under review). 
255. See Letter from Richard D. Godown, Executive Director, Industrial Biotechnol-
ogy Association, to Dr. James Glosser, Associate Administrator, Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service 7 (Sept. 24, 1986) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
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remove a host or sector from its list of potential plant 
pathogens. 2116 
e. Other uses- The EPA publishes public notice of each 
TSCA premanufacture notification that it receives.2117 In addi-
tion, the Agency must on a monthly basis publish a list of all 
premanufacture notices for which the ninety-day response pe-
riod has not expired.2118 Chemical manufacturers, however, typi-
cally claim that virtually the entire contents of their 
premanufacture submissions and any required premanufacture 
testing constitute trade secrets. Although the EPA usually 
makes an effort to describe in generic terms the nature of the 
substance at issue and the results of health and safety testing, it 
is nevertheless often difficult for the public to decide on the ba-
sis of publicly available information whether it should be con-
cerned about the product. The statute requires that health and 
safety data be made available to the public, despite trade se-
crecy claims, 2119 but the Agency generally does not force the issue 
until a request has been filed under the Freedom of Information 
Act. 
The TSCA makes no provision for a public hearing prior to 
the expiration of the ninety days during which the EPA may act 
to prevent the manufacture of the chemical. The EPA may nev-
ertheless voluntarily conduct a hearing on a premanufacture no-
tification, and it has recently done so with respect to the first 
notification for a genetically engineered microorganism.260 Any 
member of the public may, however, comment in writing on the 
risks and benefits of any substance that is the subject of a 
premanufacture notification during the ninety-day period. In ad-
dition, the Agency must publish reasons for any decision not to 
take action with respect to a new chemical for which the Agency 
has made a generic finding that release into the environment 
"may present" an unreasonable risk of injury to health or to the 
environment. 261 There is, of course, no public participation with 
respect to substances that are released in connection with pri-
256. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,913 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 340.4). 
257. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(d)(2) (1982). 
258. Id. § 2604(d)(3). 
259. Id. § 2613(b)-(c). 
260. See Pesticide and Toxic Chemical News, Feb. 11, 1987, at 3; Mellon Comments, 
supra note 37. 
261. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(g), 2604(b)(4)(A)(i) (1982). Although the Administrator is re-
quired to publish a statement of reasons prior to the expiration of the 90-day period, 
failure to publish the statement does not prevent the manufacturer from distributing the 
substance after the expiration of the 90-day period. Id. § 2604(g). 
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vately sponsored research and development that is not for com-
mercial purposes. 282 
2. Genetically engineered plants- Neither the FPPA nor 
the Noxious Weed Act provides for public participation in deci-
sions about the release of genetically engineered plants beyond 
the opportunity to read and comment upon the Agency's envi-
ronmental assessment, and the USDA has not acted on its own 
to expand public participation in those decisions. 283 
~ 
V. WILLINGNESS TO REGULATE 
A regulatory regime based upon the most generous statutory 
authority will be inadequate if the agency administering the pro-
gram is unwilling to regulate efficiently and effectively. The per-
ceived willingness of a regulatory agency to regulate is critical to 
the trust that the public places in its decisions and, conse-
quently, to the public's confidence in the regulated technology. 
The experience of nuclear power regulation in the United States 
is often cited as an example of how not to secure public trust in 
a regulatory agency and its regulated industry.284 Part of the 
current debate over biotechnology is directed to the perceived 
willingness of the USDA and the EPA effectively to assess and 
manage its risks. 
Although it is too early to tell how effective a regulator the 
USDA will be, there are disturbing indications that it may not 
function as an aggressive overseer. First, the Department finds 
itself in the same sort of "institutional conflict of interest" that 
characterized the old Atomic Energy Commission.26c; The same 
institutional entity that has the responsibility for regulating the 
technology to prevent unacceptable risks is also charged with 
promoting it. For example, the USDA has boasted that it "has 
been in the forefront in the development of modern biotechnol-
262. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48. 
263. The Noxious Weed Act does have a provision for a public hearing on the deci-
sion whether to list a plant as a noxious weed, see supra note 53, but there is no public 
participation in the decision whether or not to issue a permit for the interstate transport 
of a listed weed. The USDA has-also adopted a process whereby a person may petition 
the agency to include a plant that is a plant pest on its long list of regulated articles. 52 
Fed. Reg. 22,913 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 340.4). 
264. See generally, E. ROLPH, NUCLEAR PowER AND THE PUBLIC SAFETY (1979); K. 
SHRADER-FRECHETTE, NUCLEAR POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY (1980). 
265. E. ROLPH, supra note 264; K. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 264. 
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ogy,"266 and it has generally demonstrated an unrestrained en-
thusiasm for agricultural biotechnologies. 267 There are occasional 
signs of struggle between the promoters and the regulators 
within the Department. 268 The Department's research budget re-
flects an almost single-minded focus on the benefits of agricul-
tural biotechnology and a relatively modest concern for explor-
ing its potential risks. 269 
Perhaps the most disturbing indication of the USDA's "go-go" 
attitude toward the benefits of biotechnology is a recently held 
"Challenge Forum on Biotechnology," in which representatives 
from the USDA and the biotechnology industry extolled its vir-
tues and belittled its risks. No representatives from public inter-
est or environmental groups were invited to attend the Chal-
266. Microbial Products, supra note 137, at 50,898; see also Coordinated Framework 
Hearing, supra note 3, at 119 (testimony of Orville Bentley, Assistant Secretary for Sci-
ence & Educ., USDA) ("It is the policy of the USDA to encourage and support the re-
sponsible development and utilization of beneficial products of modern biotechnology 
consistent with the protection of public safety and the environment."). 
267. See GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 60. Professor Robert Colwell, an ecolo-
gist who has advised the USDA on the environmental impacts of agricultural biotechnol-
ogy has observed: 
Traditionally, the U.S.D.A. has seen itself as not only an active promoter (and 
funder) of basic research, but also as a sort of travelling salesman of applied 
technology, working closely with seed companies, agrochemical firms, and farm 
machinery manufacturers to achieve the laudable goal of helping America's 
farmers and ranchers to maximize their productivity. I anticipate that in five 
years, Agricultural Extension agents will be promoting the use of genetically en-
gineered crops, farm animals, and microbial inputs. Meanwhile, we are assured 
by unnamed "knowledgeable ARS [Agricultural Research Service] official[s]" 
and unnamed Assistant Administrators that approval to release genetically engi-
neered organisms "would not be given without careful scrutiny." 
Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 80. He concluded: "In retrospect, I think we 
might have done well to have had the two roles of the U.S.D.A., as promoter and regula-
tor, in separate and independent agencies." Id. 
268. GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 52; Foudin Interview, supra note 197 (in-
dicating that regulators received pressure from other offices not to undertake thorough 
reviews of genetically engineered microorganisms that might be plant pests). 
269. See Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 42 (testimony of Martin Alexan-
der, Professor of Agronomy, Cornell Univ.) (complaining of the lack of USDA support 
for research into the risks of agricultural biotechnologies); id. at 80 (testimony of Robert 
K. Colwell, Professor of Zoology, University of Cal., Berkeley, Cal.) (expressing same 
concerns as Dr. Alexander); id. at 123 (testimony of Brian Crowley, Senior Assoc. Direc-
tor, Resources, Community & Economic Dev. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office). In 
1984-1985, the USDA funded $40.5 million in biotechnology research. Eighty-seven of 
778 projects involved the possibility of large-scale release. Of those, only three addressed 
risk assessment as an integral part of the research plan. IssuEs IN FEDERAL REGULATION 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 34. From October 1, 1983 to September 30, 1984, USDA fund-
ing for activities identified as risk assessment for biotechnology totalled approximately 
$700,000. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 124 (testimony of Brian Crowley, 
Senior Assoc. Director, Resources, Community & Economic Dev. Div., U.S. Gen. Ac-
counting Office). 
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lenge Forum and none were listed on the long participant list. 
The USDA's summary of the proceedings, which can only be de-
scribed as a glowing endorsement of modern agricultural bio-
technology, contains the following exhortations: 
New biotechnology techniques are extensions and refine-
ments of older techniques for genetic manipulation. They 
are not technological disjunctions such as the advent of 
nuclear fission . 
. . . [Modern biotechnology is] a quantum leap in un-
derstanding ... [It is] a bases-loaded home-run, a mas-
terful event . . . we are witnessing the advent of a golden 
age in agriculture ... a "Biological Age" with the poten-
tial to do for mankind in the 21st Century what the Ma-
chine Age did for industrialization in the 19th Century. 
. . . One of the most profound challenges that we all 
face is to overcome the common misapprehensions, or 
myths, surrounding new biotechnology. Biotechnology 
myths can be damaging when they confuse or mislead the 
media, the Congress, and the public. Such myths can cost 
us dearly in delaying the fruits of new technology that 
may significantly improve the quality and duration of 
life. 
. Some think all biotech products are potentially 
too dangerous . . . others call for a tight rein on biotech 
research, making analogies to the introduction of kudzu, 
gypsy moth, and chestnut blight. That's faulty, said one 
speaker: Those introductions involved organisms totally 
unrelated to the ecosystem ... new biotech products in-
volve modification of organisms that are indigenous to 
the parent ecosystem. 270 
This one-sided view of biotechnology's benefits and risks does 
not inspire confidence in the USDA as a regulator of agricultural 
biotechnology. 
The USDA has played the role of promoter and regulator of a 
technology once before, when it was given the inconsistent tasks 
270. USDA Biotechnology Challenge Forum, Highlight Summary, at 1-4 (Feb. 11, 
1987). 
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of promoting and regulating pesticides.271 While the USDA was 
playing both roles, it registered hundreds of pesticides, many on 
the basis of data that were later found to be wholly inade-
quate. 272 But it doggedly resisted all efforts to take proven "bad 
actors" such as DDT and Aldrin/Dieldrin off the market. This 
institutional conflict of interest was a major factor in the trans-
fer of pesticide regulatory authority to the EPA in 1970. There 
is little reason to believe that the same entity that did such a 
poor job of regulating pesticides will do a better job of protect-
ing society from the risks of agricultural biotechnologies. 
The USDA's public statements indicate that it has firmly 
adopted the position that genetically engineered plants and mi-
croorganisms are presumed to be no different than normal 
plants and organisms. 273 This benign attitude stands in contrast 
to many of the cautious statements of independent scientists 
and other federal agencies. 274 Indeed, USDA scientists have been 
highly critical of the EP A's cautious approach toward allowing 
deliberate releases of genetically engineered microorganisms. 275 
One scientist who has advised both the USDA and the EPA on 
the environmental effects of genetically engineered microorga-
nisms notes two "distinctly different 'flavors' " in regulatory ap-
proach: the EPA's evaluation process "maintained an air of im-
partial judgment," while the USDA found certain National 
Institutes of Health guidelines in the agricultural arena to be 
"unnecessarily onerous. "276 
271. The USDA regulated pesticides until 1970, when the function was transferred to 
the EPA. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, reprinted in 5 u.s.C. app. at 
1132 (1982), and in 84 Stat. 2086, as amended by Act of Aug. 23, 1983, Pub. L. 98-80, 
§ 2(a)(2), (b)(2), (c)(2)(C), 97 Stat. 485. 
272. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS, RESEARCH, AND FOREIGN AGRI-
CULTURE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON REGU-
LATORY PROCEDURES AND PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES IN THE EPA's OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PRO-
GRAMS (Comm. Print 1982); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE REGULATION OF PESTICIDES (Comm. Print 
1976) [hereinafter KENNEDY REPORT]. 
273. See Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 168 (testimony of John Patrick 
Jordan, Administrator, Cooperative State Research Serv., USDA) ("[A]gricultural and 
forestry products developed through the use of biotechnology will not differ fundamen-
tally in use and application from conventional products."); GAO USDA REPORT, supra 
note 4, at 27. 
274. See A. Carr, supra note 56, at 3, 14. 
275. See GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 47. 
276. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 81 (testimony of Robert K. Colwell, 
Professor of Zoology, University of Cal., Berkeley, Cal.); see also Coordinated Frame-
work Hearing, supra note 3, at 79 (testimony of Elliott A. Norse, Director, Public Affairs 
Office, The Ecological Soc'y of Am.) (complaining that the Coordinated Framework "is 
unbalanced, leaning too far toward allowing releases of engineered organisms without the 
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In its defense, the USDA points out that its promotional ac-
tivities are segregated within the Department and are lodged 
under an entirely different Assistant Secretary. 277 The Depart-
ment has also made a commendable effort to keep the two func-
tions separate in its Coordinated Framework policy announce-
ments. 278 Moreover, the National Environmental Policy Act, 
which did not exist during the days that the USDA regulated 
pesticides, may have made the Department more sensitive to en-
vironmental concerns,279 especially because an inadequate envi-
ronmental impact assessment for a major action can result in a 
burdensome lawsuit.280 In addition, the USDA's past track rec-
ord in protecting plants and animals from well known plant 
pests, noxious weeds, and infectious diseases is impressive. 281 
Nevertheless, the evidence of the USDA's institutional attitude 
about modern biotechnology leaves a considerable lingering 
doubt about its commitment to protecting society from the risks 
of genetically engineered plants and microorganisms, 282 and 
some have suggested that the best institutional arrangement 
may be to place responsibility for regulating agricultural bio-
technologies in another agency.283 
The obvious candidate for transfer of authority is the EPA, 
which, in any event, will have a large role to play in regulating 
agricultural biotechnologies. Although the EPA is not plagued 
with the USDA's institutional conflict of interest, its effective-
ness in regulating chemicals is far from exemplary. Its chemical 
safeguards that are appropriate at this stage of the technology's development"); GAO 
USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 36 ("USDA officials did not want to impose cumbersome 
regulations t'hat might stifle growth in biotechnology research or in the industries that 
have sprung from that research."). 
277. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 174 (testimony of John Patrick Jor-
dan, Administrator, Cooperative State Research Serv., USDA). 
278. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 123 (testimony of Karen 
Darling, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg. & Inspection Servs., USDA). 
279. S. TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK (1984). 
280. See GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 36 (indicating that USDA is worried 
about lawsuits from opponents of biotechnology); see also Foundation on Economic 
Trends v. Block, No. Civ. A. 84-3045 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds li-
brary, DCT file) (holding that animal productivity research is not major federal action 
requiring environmental assessment or environmental impact statement). 
281. See GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 31. 
282. For example, there are indications that the formal separation of promotional 
and regulatory functions is more illusory than real. The Associate Administrator of 
APHIS recently told a "Challenge Forum" that: "We in APHIS have been linked to ... 
developments [in biotechnology] not only because of our regulatory responsibilities but 
also because USDA with the people it represents, and the programs it supports, is one of 
• the biggest beneficiaries of this science." Remarks of James W. Glosser, Associate Adm'r, 
APHIS,. USDA, at the Biotechnology Challenge Forum (Feb. 5, 1987). 
283. NRDC Comments, supra note 147. 
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regulation program has promulgated fewer than a dozen major 
rules regulating toxic substances in its eleven year history.28" Al-
though the pesticide program in the EPA was very active in the 
mid-1970's, it too has been plagued by severe management and 
morale problems.2811 The EPA has also been criticized for failing 
to register new pesticides in an expeditious fashion, a problem 
that has plagued the newer biological pesticides even more se-
verely than traditional chemical pesticides.286 Thus, although en-
vironmental groups advocate giving the EPA exclusive authority 
to regulate agricultural biotechnologies, biotechnology compa-
nies are largely satisfied with the USDA's determination to play 
a major role. 
It is very difficult to assess these arguments objectively. The 
USDA's history and its recent statements belittling risks of agri-
cultural biotechnology justify a fair degree of skepticism about 
the willingness of that Department to be an effective regulator. 
The Department's unconstrained optimism about the benefits of 
agricultural biotechnology, exemplified in the recent "Secre-
tary's Challenge Forum on Biotechnology," gives credence to the 
charge that the Department is likely to accentuate the benefits 
over the risks. On the other hand, the USDA's role in regulating 
biotechnology is not a very large one. Its role in regulating 
animal biologics is quite limited, and its regulatory program in 
that area seems very effective. Apparently by choice, its program 
for regulating animal diseases will be almost irrelevant to geneti-
cally engineered microorganisms. This regulatory function will 
go by default to the EPA under the TSCA, so long as the EPA 
does not erroneously assume that the USDA is in fact attempt-
ing to protect animals from new diseases resulting from geneti-
cally engineered microorganisms. 
The only area in which USDA and EPA authorities overlap to 
any significant degree is in protecting plants from genetically en-
gineered microorganisms. It is possible that the EPA would do a 
more effective job than the USDA in this area, but that is by no 
means certain. The USDA has proposed a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme under the FPP A to regulate genetically engineered 
microorganisms that may be plant pests. All indications are that 
the USDA is serious about this job, despite pressures from else-
where within the Department. The EPA also has a role to play 
284. See id. at 31. 
285. KENNEDY REPORT, supra note 272. 
286. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture on Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act Extension, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1975) (testimony of 
Jack D. Early, Vice President, National Agricultural Chems. Ass'n). 
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under the TSCA in assessing the risks of genetically engineered 
microorganisms that are not on the USDA's list of plant pest 
hosts and vectors or that are not determined to be plant pests. 
The USDA and the EPA have recognized the possibility for 
overlap, and they have provided for coordinated reviews in these 
instances to ensure that data requests are not duplicated.287 Per-
haps an adequate check on any perceived tendency on the 
USDA's part to slight risks and. accentuate benefits is to provide 
for dual review of all genetically engineered microorganisms that 
might be plant pests. The obvious inefficiency of dual review 
may be outweighed by the increased confidence that the public 
is likely to have in the ultimate product. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
When we piece together the patchwork of statutes and regula-
tory programs, it becomes apparent that nearly all modern agri-
cultural biotechnologies are addressed to some extent. When 
measured against the elements of an adequate regulatory re-
gime, however, there are some important gaps in coverage and 
some inadequacies in the programs that are covered. As previ-
ously suggested, this should not be surprising given the orienta-
tion of the applicable statutes, but it is somewhat disappointing 
that the EPA's gap-filling function under the TSCA has not pro-
vided a complete backstop. 
A. Prerelease Notification 
Some large-scale releases of genetically engineered microorga-
nisms that may be relevant to agriculture can take place under 
the existing regulatory regimes without any notification to any 
federal regulatory agency. Generally, the EPA must receive pre-
release notification of all genetically engineered microorganisms, 
even if no other program requires prerelease notification.288 
Thus, even though the USDA does not require prerelease notifi-
cation of experimental biological products when the experiments 
are undertaken in unlicensed facilities and there is no interstate 
transport, the EPA would have to be notified: And even though 
287. Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,906. 
288. There will be prerelease notification of all genetically engineered pesticides. See 
supra text accompanying note 142. 
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the USDA may not regard field testing of genetically engineered 
microorganisms in the environment to constitute a "release," the 
EPA probably considers it to be a release under the TSCA. The 
fact that the USDA's authority to require prerelease notification 
of interstate shipments of animal diseases and that even this re-
quirement is largely applicable only to well-known diseases for 
which the USDA has established quarantine programs only 
mean that prerelease notification of microorganisms that might 
cause animal diseases will go to the EPA, rather than the USDA. 
Finally, to the extent that a person genetically engineers a prod-
uct from the hosts and vectors on the USDA's list of potential 
plant pests but determines that the final product does not meet 
the definition of "plant pest," the EPA must be notified of the 
new "chemical substance." 
Before we can confidently conclude, however, that the EPA 
will receive prerelease notification of all genetically engineered 
microorganisms, we must examine some of the weaknesses and 
gaps in the TSCA program. For example, the entire TSCA pro-
gram may be inapplicable if the EP A's broad reading of the 
words "chemical substance" to include genetically engineered 
micr9organisms is not upheld by the courts. To avoid the regula-
tory instability that would accompany a lawsuit challenging the 
EPA's authority to regulate biotechnology, Congress should en-
act a statute clarifying the EPA's gap-filling power in the con-
text of biotechnology. 
The TSCA's prerelease notification requirements do not reach 
privately sponsored noncommercial research and development, 
such as that undertaken in academic facilities without federal 
grants. When Congress included this exemption in the TSCA, it 
did not envision that the EPA would play a regulatory role with 
respect to potentially harmful organisms that might proliferate 
in the environment. Congress should now amend the TSCA to 
give the EPA authority to require prerelease notification of any 
deliberate releases of genetically engineered microorganisms, to 
the extent that notification is not already forthcoming under 
some other statute. Academic scientists are not immune from 
the kinds of pressures that cause people to make errors of judg-
ment, and they should not be treated differently as a matter of 
principle. 289 
Finally, the EPA has voluntarily exempted organisms result-
ing from intrageneric gene transfers when the host organism is 
289. See generally McGarity, Contending Approaches to Regulating Laboratory 
Safety, 28 KAN. L. REV. 183 (1980). 
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nonpathogenic and organisms resulting from intergeneric trans-
fers when the transferred material is only a well-characterized, 
non-coding, regulatory region. 290 The first exemption may be 
justified for reasons of administrative practicality and because it 
is possible to make a generic determination that such organisms 
are not likely to pose environmental risks. In any event, the ex-
emption may not be very large, because the EPA has defined 
"pathogen" very broadly to include most current recombinant 
DNA activities.291 The second exemption, which the USDA has 
followed under the FPPA,292 is probably unwarranted, and both 
the EPA and the USDA should amend their regulations to re-
peal it. 
Currently, there are virtually no legal requirements for pre-
release notification of genetically engineered plants. Only the 
USDA requires prerelease notification of genetically engineered 
plants that are on the list of pathogenic organisms and vec-
tors. 293 The TSCA does not give the EPA any gap-filling role 
whatsoever for plants. Thus, there can be no assurance that the 
harm producing potential of genetically engineered plants will 
come to the attention of any agency prior to actual damage. Be-
cause genetically engineered plants may not pose the same risks 
of widespread ecological damage as genetically engineered mi-
croorganisms, this may be deemed acceptable. If, however, Con-
gress believes that prerelease notification of genetically engi-
neered plants is desirable, it should amend the TSCA to give the 
EPA the same gap-filling authority for plants that it gives it for 
genetically engineered microorganisms. 
B. Data Collection, Data Evaluation, and Risk Assessment 
The ability of the EPA and the USDA to require proponents 
of agricultural biotechnologies to submit health and safety data 
prior to release varies greatly from program to program. For pes-
ticides and veterinary biologics, the EPA and the USDA have 
established data gathering and evaluation requirements that 
290. See supra note 120. 
291. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,333-34; Mellon Comments, supra 
note 37. 
292. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58. 
293. The USDA's authority, however, probably only extends to parasitic plants. See 
supra text accompanying note 158. 
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seem adequate.m It is not clear at this point whether the USDA 
will require very extensive testing for adverse environmental ef-
fects prior to release. 2911 The USDA has exercised its authority 
under the FPP A to require testing for organisms on its list of 
plant pathogens and vectors that are also plant pests, but it has 
not developed testing protocols. The USDA might usefully ex-
amine the EPA's protocols for conventional biological pesticides 
to provide guidance in its case by case evaluation of its data 
needs. 
Testing for genetically engineered microorganisms that are not 
pesticides and not on the USDA's plant pest list will be re-
quired, if at all, by the EPA under its TSCA authority. Yet the 
EPA can only require a bare minimum data set with 
premanufacture notification, and it must be prepared to bear 
the burden of proving in district court the need to prohibit the 
release of an organism while additional data requirements are 
being met. Given the novelty of agricultural biotechnologies, 
Congress may conclude that this is not an adequate testing re-
gime. If so, Congress could amend the TSCA to give the EPA 
the authority to prevent the release of genetically engineered mi-
croorganisms if it is unable to determine whether their deliber-
ate release will cause unreasonable adverse effects on the envi-
ronment without additional information. Congress could achieve 
the same result by establishing a permitting regime similar to 
that of the FIFRA and the FPP A. 
There is currently no testing regime for genetically engineered 
plants other than those listed on the USDA's plant pest list that 
also meet the definition of "plant pest."296 If Congress believes 
that testing of genetically engineered plants is desirable, it 
should amend the TSCA as suggested above to include plants as 
well as microorganisms. 
C. Risk Management 
Assuming that a permitting regime is adequate, the risk man-
agement regimes for pesticides, veterinary biologics, and plant 
pests are adequate. Since the USDA's regulatory regime for 
animal diseases is extremely limited, the EPA's TSCA authori-
294. The EPA's incomplete data requirements for its "Level I" evaluation of the 
need for an experimental use permit for small-scale testing casts some doubt upon this 
generally optimistic assessment. 
295. See supra text accompanying notes 179-83. 
296. Again, the USDA's authority probably does not extend beyond parasitic plants. 
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ties will govern virtually all other agricultural biotechnologies. 
Importantly, the TSCA does not establish a permitting regula-
tory regime. Manufacturers are free to distribute genetically en-
gineered microorganisms ninety days after submitting a 
premanufacture notification to the EPA, unless the EPA as-
sumes the affirmative burden of demonstrating that the manu-
facture, distribution, or use of the substance will present an un-
reasonable risk of injury to humans or to the environment. 
Under the current TSCA regime, inertia works in favor of the 
release of the microorganism. This will only be satisfactory if the 
EPA is given the resources to evaluate effectively the hundreds 
of premanufacture notifications that it can expect to receive in 
the near future. Otherwise, Congress should amend the TSCA to 
give the EPA permitting authority similar to that of the 
FIFRA.297 
The only available regulatory regimes for genetically engi-
neered plants are the FPP A, which is limited to parasitic plants, 
and the Noxious Weed Act, which is limited to interstate impor-
tation and transport of plants that are known to be weeds. 
Neither of these authorities provides much protection for 
nonparasitic plants until long after damage has occurred. If Con-
gress determines that this is not an acceptable state of affairs, it 
should amend either the FPP A or the TSCA to give the USDA 
or the EPA authority to take action prior to the release of genet-
ically engineered plants that might harm the environment. 
D. Public Participation 
All of the USDA-administered regulatory regimes are woefully 
inadequate from the perspective of public participation. None 
provide for public hearings prior to release of genetically engi-
neered microorganisms, and none even provide for public notice 
of impending releases. The only public role is the very limited 
one of commenting upon environmental impact statements in 
cases in which they are prepared and commenting upon environ-
mental assessments in the (perhaps) rare case in which a mem-
ber of the public learns that an environmental assessment has 
been prepared. The USDA should remedy this inadequate situa-
tion by writing procedural regulations that provide for publica-
297. But see Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 132 (testimony of 
John Moore, Assistant Adm'r for Pesticides & Toxic Substances, EPA) (arguing against 
amending the TSCA to establish a permitting regime). 
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tion of permit applications for genetically engineered plants and 
microorganisms and that allow for informed public comment. 
The opportunities for public participation in the EPA's pesti-
cide program are much more extensive, but they are still limited 
by the inaccessibility of health and safety data prior to the deci-
sion to grant a registration or an experimental use permit and 
the absence of a hearing prior to the registration decision. Al-
though the EPA has commendably provided for an informal 
public hearing prior to making experimental use permit deci-
sions of "regional or national" significance, it has not adequately 
explained why a public hearing would not be desirable for re-
leases of only local significance. The Agency should allow public 
participation in all experimental use permit determinations, and 
it should attempt to facilitate citizen access to relevant health 
and safety data. 
Public participation under the TSCA is even more extensive 
than under the FIFRA, but it too is plagued by the vexing prob-
lem of the trade secret status of health and safety testing data. 
Because the agency always gives the manufacturer an opportu-
nity to sue in district court to prevent the release of information, 
manufacturers can as a practical matter delay providing health 
and safety data to the public until after the substance has been 
released, thereby effectively frustrating public participation in 
the decision to release. Although no companies have so far been 
this belligerent, the possibility still exists. Congress could rem-
edy this problem by empowering the EPA to prevent the manu-
facture or distribution of a substance until all disputes over 
health and safety data have been resolved. 
E. Willingness to Regulate 
Part V of this Article related several disturbing indications 
that the USDA may not be willing to regulate agricultural bio-
technologies as effectively as the EPA would be. The USDA's 
institutional conflict of interest and its numerous public state-
ments accentuating the benefits and belittling the risks of bio-
technology certainly justify some skepticism about the Agency's 
desire to regulate agricultural biotechnologies. On the other 
hand, the EPA has not been an especially aggressive regulator of 
toxic substances and pesticides during the last several years, and 
it does not have the USDA's expertise in animal biologics and 
plant pests. 
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Biotechnology can get off to the running start that its propo-
nents desire only if the public can trust the regulatory agencies 
that have been created to protect health and the environment. 
Without strong public confidence in the agencies, the technology 
may proceed, but it will face numerous delays and the possibility 
of a complete loss of public trust when, as is almost inevitable, 
something does go wrong. If the USDA's past activities and pre-
sent pronouncements do not inspire the kind of public confi-
dence that is necessary, at least three solutions are possible. 
First, Congress can create an entirely new and independent 
agency. This solution would be expensive and time consuming, 
and it would no doubt be controversial at a time in which the 
public mood seems antagonistic to new federal agencies. In any 
event, it might well prove self-defeating, because the agency 
would no doubt be staffed with many of the same people who 
are currently running the programs in the USDA. 
Second, Congress could transfer to the EPA all authority to 
regulate agricultural biotechnologies. Although the EPA could 
gear up to do the job and although the public may have margin-
ally more confidence in the EP A's regulatory aggressiveness, this 
solution would also be time consuming and expensive. In addi-
tion, it would necessarily involve jurisdictional battles in both 
the House and the Senate where jurisdiction over agencies in the 
USDA is lodged in one committee and jurisdiction over the EPA 
is lodged in another committee. Finally, many of the same per-
sonnel would no doubt be transferred to the EPA as the USDA's 
pesticides regulatory staff was transferred to the EPA in 1970. 
Third, Congress could simply provide for overlapping jurisdic-
tion in both the USDA and the EPA for functions that are now 
assigned to the USDA alone. This could be accomplished with a 
minimum of effort by amending the TSCA. This solution is ob-
viously burdensome for the regulated industry, because applica-
tions for permits and licenses would have to be cleared through 
both agencies. But this disadvantage may, in the long run, be 
outweighed by the ease with which permitting decisions could be 
made in a regulatory setting devoid of the suspicion that cur-
rently characterizes the public view of the USDA. 
Even if Congress determines that no change in the institu-
tional arrangements is desirable, the USDA could greatly en-
hance public confidence in its decisions by allowing the public to 
play a much greater role in its decisionmaking, as previously 
suggested. Providing notice to the public of pending license and 
permit requests and allowing informed public comment would 
be burdensome to the agency, and it might slow down the regu-
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latory process somewhat, but enhanced public trust in the 
USDA's regulatory decisions may warrant these inconveniences. 
F. Conclusion 
If current optimism about agricultural biotechnology is war-
ranted, the USDA and the EPA should soon be flooded with ap-
plications for permits to test and market an astonishing variety 
of useful products. If the past is an appropriate indicator, some 
of these new products will pose risks to humans and to the envi-
ronment. Both agencies have recognized the major roles that 
they will play in protecting the public from the risks of agricul-
tural biotechnologies, and both have adjusted their traditional 
programs to meet their statutory obligations. Yet these efforts 
have not yielded an adequate regulatory regime for biotechnol-
ogy, especially insofar as the public is to play a role in the regu-
latory process. With relatively minor changes to existing stat-
utes, however, Congress can pave the way for the establishment 
of a regulatory regime that can give the public the protection 
that it deserves without depriving society of the enormous bene-
fits of these exciting new products. 

